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1 Introduction 
In recent years, the number of researchers investigating topics related 
to the field of corruption has been constantly rising. Corruption has 
become a dominant subject matter in the media, and especially in 
Western European states, the newspaper articles on corruption cases 
are no longer exclusive to African or Post-Communist states but have 
become domestic affairs. This has also led to an increased interest in 
anti-corruption efforts and the organisations and governing bodies 
involved in this area. As a worldwide organisation, the United Nations 
plays a crucial role in the fight against corruption. The phenomenon 
has existed since the dawn of mankind but it was not always 
considered to be entirely negative. In some contexts, for instance, 
corruption in developing countries was even believed to be beneficial 
to a certain degree by some researchers in the 1970s.  
My personal interest in the issue began several years ago. As a student I 
had the privilege to be able to do two internships closely linked to the 
field discussed in this thesis. First, very early on in my studies, in the 
summer of 2008, I completed an internship with the UNODC, to be 
precise with what at that time was the section for Economic Crime and 
Corruption at the Treaty and Legal Assistance Branch, which was part 
of the Division for Treaty Affairs of the UNODC. This internship was 
conducted under the supervision of Crime Prevention Expert Erik N. 
Larson. During this time I worked on the Institutional Integrity Initiative 
and, more importantly, came into first direct contact with the UNCAC 
while assisting in the implementation of the Pilot Review Programme. 
This launched my interest in the United Nations’ efforts in the fight 
against corruption. Later on, in spring 2011, I was an intern at the United 
States Mission to the International Organisations in Vienna at the UN 
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Affairs section, where I had the opportunity to assist the incoming 
delegation from Washington during the 20th session of the CCPCJ, as 
well as the 2nd Session of the Implementation Review Group for the 
UNCAC, amongst others. All of these experiences also gave me the 
opportunity to conduct scientific observations as to how the meetings 
function, and how the decision-making processes in reality might differ 
from the purely technical parameters.  
The aim of this thesis is to closely examine the anti-corruption efforts of 
the United Nations. The questions at hand is whether we can study the 
United Nations’ anti-corruption efforts solely by analysing the UNCAC, 
whilst regarding all previous anti-corruption efforts as stepping stones, 
and if not stepping stones, then at least as one big entity which 
comprises a unified United Nations anti-corruption regime? In this thesis I 
will argue that it might be more useful to take a different approach and 
see the United Nations’ efforts regarding anti-corruption as two, three 
or maybe even four closely linked regimes.  
The United Nations has other entities that also play or have the 
potential to play an important role in anti-corruption efforts. I will argue 
that the UNCAC is indeed a significant anti-corruption regime, but that 
equally, the UN houses one or more other regimes which either deal 
partially with corruption issues or with specialised aspects of corruption. 
The guiding hypothesis of this thesis is that the Crime Congress, the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, and the Stolen Asset Recovery 
Initiative are each a regime of their own standing, if they differ 
significantly in their norms and principles (cf. chapter 2). If the norms 
and principles of two or more entities are identical, then those entities 
belong to the same regime. Thus it would be possible to identify four 
different regimes, but also to have no more than one, depending on 
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the outcome of the analysis. Although the other two features of a 
regime, namely the rules and decision-making processes, are important 
for the description of a regime, they are not key elements to distinguish 
between regimes (cf. chapter 2). 
On a technical note, concerning political correctness in this paper, I 
would like to state that because it increases readability, I will only use 
the male form when referring to a person, scholar, etc. in general. 
However, I do not intend to discriminate against anyone because of his 
gender by using this form.  
 
1.1 State of the art 
Corruption as a topic of academic research has recently become 
increasingly popular. Scholars from a broad range of academic fields 
including political science, social science, cultural studies and others 
have shown a heightened interest in the subject. The topic was first 
taken up in modern times by researches such as Samuel Huntington 
and Joseph S. Nye in the 1960s and 1970s, especially with regards to its 
effect on developing states. Thirty years later, at the beginning of the 
21st century, corruption reappeared on the radar of scholars worldwide. 
Not only do different scientific disciplines concern themselves with 
corruption, but they also look at a broad number of aspects of 
corruption, and phenomena that can be linked to corruption. One of 
the very early, but still frequently quoted and discussed, works on a 
theoretical conception of corruption is Arnold Heidenheimer’s Political 
Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (1970).   
In the German-speaking community, two important works on the topic 
are Ulrich von Alemann’s Dimensionen politischer Korruption from 2005 
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and Ilan Fellmann’s Vademecum der Korruptionsbekämpfung from 
2010.  In Austria an important scholar, especially in the area of party 
funding, is Hubert Sickinger, and his best-known publication on this 
matter is a very comprehensive work on party funding in Austria called 
Politikfinanzierung in Österreich, also from 2009. A recent publication 
with an interdisciplinary approach is Korruption als globale 
Herausforderung, edited by Lukas Achathaler, Domenica Hofmann 
and Matthias Pázmándy, published in 2011. It is not only comprised of 
articles by researches emerging from different fields, but also offers a 
number of insights from practitioners. Coming directly from what could 
be called the “front line” is The Corruption Monster – Ethik, Politik und 
Korruption (2009a) by Martin Kreutner, the former director of the 
Austrian Federal Bureau for Internal Affairs.  
Regarding anti-corruption regimes, especially Holger Moroff’s article 
“Internationalisierung von Anti-Korruptionsregimen” in Alemann’s work 
presents an important insight into the field. Another publication worth 
mentioning in this context is Anti-Corruption Regimes in Europe edited 
by Sebastian Wolf and Diana Schmidt-Pfister in 2010.  
It can be assumed that research in the area of corruption will continue 
to expand because of several reasons. On the one hand, corruption 
scandals are receiving more and more media coverage, especially 
when public officials are discovered to have been involved in corrupt 
practices – such as the Austrian EU Parliamentarian and former Minister 
for the Interior Ernst Strasser, South African former police chief Jackie 
Selebi or Norihiko Akagi, former Japanese Minister for Forestry and 
Fishery. On the other hand, the groundwork for corruption research has 
been done, which makes the topic more easily accessible for young 
academics and students. Lastly, it is noteworthy that more institutions 
are being created which deal specifically with corruption research, 
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such as, for example, the International Anti-Corruption Academy in 
Austria.  
 
1.2 Terminology 
There is no universal understanding of corruption, and scholars have not 
yet found a common definition for the phenomenon, in part also 
because the term is culturally dependent and determined. What in one 
culture is considered to be a corrupt act is not seen this way in others. A 
good example for this is nepotism, which is considered to be part of the 
social order in some cultures, while in others it is seen as an act of 
corruption. Even within a society the perception of what is considered 
to be corrupt changes over time.  
That corruption is not a new phenomenon but that it has always existed 
can be shown by its thematisation in various historical works and 
cultural artefacts. For instance, in the Old Testament it is stated that 
“[y]ou shall take no bribe, for a bribe blinds the officials, and subverts 
the cause of those who are in the right” (Exodus 22:8). In the New 
Testament, we find bribery as a characteristic of “sinners” and “bloody 
men”: “Do not sweep me away with sinners, nor my life with the 
bloodthirsty, those in whose hands are evil devices, and whose right 
hands are full of bribes” (Psalm 26:9-10 “Plea for Justice and 
Declaration of Righteousness”). In Dante’s Divine Comedy, fraud is 
discussed in Inferno Canto: X1 “But because fraud is man's peculiar 
vice,/ More it displeases God; and so stand lowest/ The fraudulent”. 
Another example comes from William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, 
where Brutus argues that because Cassius’s name is connected with 
corruption in the minds of the public, corruption becomes 
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unpunishable: “The name of Cassius honours this corruption,/ And 
chastisement doth therefore hide his head” (Shakespeare, 4.3.15-16). 
However, this is not only the case in the tradition of cultures influenced 
by Abrahamic religions, but, for example, corruption is also the topic of 
the book Arthashastra written by Kautilya, an Indian politician 2000 
years ago (cf. Tanzi 1998: 559).  
The word “corruption” originates from the Latin word “corrumpere” (to 
spoil, to taint, to rot), which itself derives from “cor” (heart) and 
“rumpere” (to break). However, while corruption has always had a 
negative connotation, this was not necessarily the case with other 
terms connected with corruption. The word “bribery,” for instance, is 
“munus” in Latin, which is synonymous for both “gift” and “bribe”. 
For the purpose of research it is important to distinguish between 
corruption as a socio-economic term, in which case its meaning is 
flexible and socially constructed, and corruption as a legal term, where 
it is very much limited to rule of law principles in each nation, and the 
respective narrow definition of the term in the criminal law of the state 
in question. Thus, even if the definition is not worded as such, the 
definition of corruption in a legal context establishes itself by the sum of 
the single phenomena it is composed of, for example bribery, which is 
in fact frequently criminalised in this context. Therefore, it is not always 
necessary to define corruption, because the definition in most cases 
becomes self-evident. Furthermore, there is a simple way of adjusting 
the definition of corruption by modifying, adding or eliminating one or 
more single phenomena. The following discussion, however, will focus 
on the socio-economic aspect of the term.  
Among scholars one of the most frequently quoted definition is the one 
Heidenheimer provided in the 19070s, where it is distinguished between 
public opinion, public office and public interest definitions of the term. 
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Heidenheimer offers very broad definitions which are also utilised as 
categories for other definitions of corruption. The first category, public 
opinion, defines corruption as all acts which are considered to be 
corrupt by the public, however, as Kurer points out, this would 
prerequisite an agreement by the entire public on which acts are 
corrupt and which are not, which is not given in modern societies. The 
public interest definition is that everything that is detrimental to the 
interest of the public is considered to be corrupt. Here again, the key 
point of criticism lies in the questionable concept of a commonly 
agreed-upon interest of a supposedly united public. Lastly, the public 
office definition, in contrast to the other two, does not include 
subjective notions of a united public, but defines corruption as 
committing an offense against formal rules of a public office for a 
private gain. At this point in time, the public office definition is the most 
popular one, as we will see later in this chapter (cf. Kurer 2003: 41-50). 
The probably best-known definition of corruption is the one used by 
Transparency International (TI hereafter), a worldwide NGO dedicated 
to the fight against corruption. It defines corruption the following way:  
Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It 
hurts everyone whose life, livelihood or happiness depends on 
the integrity of people in a position of authority. (TI 2011).  
A similar definition is used by Martin Kreutner, who defines corruption as 
“Missbrauch einer übertragenen Macht- oder Entscheidungsbefugnis zu 
eigener (oder eines Dritten) Vorteilsnahme”1 (Kreutner 2006b: 209). The 
World Bank defines corruption as “abuse of public office for private 
gain” (Kaufmann 1997: 1). Nye proposes the following definition, 
“behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of the public role 
because of private regarding“ (Nye 1967: 284). All abovementioned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Abuse of an assigned power or decision-making authority for personal advantage 
(or the advantage of a third party).  
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definitions fall into Heidenheimer’s category of public office definitions. 
They all consider the public role or office, and in all cases the objective 
of the corrupt person is personal benefit or enrichment. As Sickinger 
points out, the fact that these definitions limit themselves to a public 
role is problematic as they effectively exclude similar acts in the private 
sector, which can have the same effect on the general public (cf. 
Sickinger 2009: 67). Sickinger himself, however, does not provide his own 
definition, but explains that he prefers to use the definition of corruption 
as the “abuse for private gain”, as this definition gives him the possibility 
to include the private sector (ibid.). Alemann follows the same train of 
thought, and emphasises that corruption should not be reduced to 
political corruption, but he rather considers political corruption to be a 
part of the entire phenomenon, as corruption in the private sector can 
have consequences for the overall society, just like corruption in the 
public sector (Alemann 2005b: 20).  
The keyword in every single definition provided here is “power”. It 
appears to be the case that the underlying principle of corruption is 
some sort of misuse or abuse of power and power-relationships. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
The guiding methodology used in this thesis was a content analysis of 
relevant documents and primary sources. Secondly, two expert 
interviews with officials of the Corruption and Economic Crime Branch 
of the United Nations were conducted in order to answer a small 
number of questions which were left open by the document analysis. 
Thirdly, especially regarding processes and the flow of work, I used the 
personal experience which I gained in the course of the two internships 
mentioned in the introduction.  
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Content analysis in the social sciences goes back to the beginning of 
the 20th century and was developed in the beginnings of what is now 
considered to be media and communication studies, as well as 
linguistics. The aim, as the name already states, of this form of analysis is 
to look closely and qualitatively at a text. In content analysis, a text is 
not only the written word, but can also refer to a picture or a motion 
picture (cf. Alemann and Forndran 1995: 172f.). Thus we can categorize 
it as a qualitative research methodology. In contrast to a pure 
quantitative analysis, where we would, for example, count how often 
the word “corruption” appears in a given text, or how often it is used in 
a headline, in qualitative analysis we also look at issues such as the 
historical context, under which category the issue of corruption might 
be subsumed, or in which context it is discussed and why. Furthermore, 
we also try to analyse potential consequences and so forth (Patzelt 
2007: 147-150). Consequently, it was only reasonable to use content 
analysis for this thesis, as the primary sources available form a vast 
amount of official documents, reports, conventions and manuals.  
The expert interviews where especially necessary in order to assess a 
possible outlook into the future, but also to reach a better 
understanding of the work being done by the specialists, which is 
directly related to the topic. The experts chosen came from both 
sections of the Corruption and Economic Crime Branch of the UNODC 
and have both been working on issues related to corruption for a long 
time. Although it would have been exciting to hold more interviews, it 
unfortunately was not possible on account of several reasons, mainly 
because of the geographical distance – for instance, direct experts 
from the StAR Initiative are located in Washington, D.C., and are 
therefore not available for interviews in Vienna.  
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The interviews were conducted orally with a semi-scripted 
questionnaire that was provided to the experts before the interviews. 
Thus the interviewees knew about the questions they were going to be 
asked and had a chance to prepare themselves, but it also left the 
possibility open to expand on questions, or go into more detail if I felt 
that this was necessary (cf. ibid.153-154). Furthermore, the experts were 
given the opportunity to elaborate on topics that needed more 
explanation in their opinion.  
Lastly, my own experience was included into this thesis. We can 
subsume this under participatory scientific observation, as my role in 
most cases, like in the CCPCJ, was to observe, assist delegates and 
take notes. I had the opportunity to get to know work flows, witness first 
hand how the decision-making process was conducted in the case of 
resolutions in the CCPCJ, how StAR Donor meetings are organised, and 
so on. Of course, some of these experiences were incorporated into 
the work of this thesis. Furthermore, this form of research also provided 
me with the opportunity to observe behaviour which is not categorised 
or discussed in primary or secondary literature, as for example the 
concept of the Vienna Spirit, which I will elaborate upon in chapter 
5.2.1.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
In order to be able to analyse the different bodies involved in the anti-
corruption efforts of the United Nations, it is immanent to use a 
theoretical framework which provides the opportunity to analyse the 
structure of such an institution and also provides criteria for such an 
analysis. 
Regime theory has been used as a basis for the analysis of anti-
corruption bodies in the past and has been proven to be the most 
fruitful approach. In this context, the word regime is not used to define 
a form of government, but is seen as a concept to describe efforts in a 
problem area. The approach first was developed in the United States in 
the 1970s.  
The most quoted definition of regimes is provided by Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye, where regimes are defined as “sets of governing 
agreements [comprised of] networks or rules, norms and procedures 
that regularize behaviour and control its effects” (Keohane and Nye 
1977: 19). This first definition was subsequently expanded and revised.  
As Ernst Haas points out, the purpose of regimes has, especially its early 
phase, been to administer the international efforts and collaboration 
on a single topic, rather than focus on a whole area of related topics 
(cf. Haas 1980: 380-81). One of the most significant revised definitions of 
regime theory is provided by Stephen Krasner. He uses a slightly 
different definition, and although he argues that it is “consistent with 
other recent formulations” of regimes (cf. Krasner 1982: 186), he defines 
regimes as  
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge 
in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of 
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fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice.  
(ibid. 186)  
In the case of international anti-corruption regimes, those decision-
making procedures also include review mechanisms.  
According to Krasner, principles and norms are fundamental for 
change. Therefore, a change in principle and norms would mean a 
regime change and thus a new regime, while changed rules and 
decision-making procedures are only seen as a change within the 
regime itself (cf. ibid. 187). Krasner defines norms, rules, procedures and 
decision-making processes very explicitly. The terms are clearly defined 
and therefore easier to apply to a certain issue and make it easier to 
analyse a regime or regimes, in contrast to the applicability of 
Keohane/Nye’s definition.  
It should be noted that, like any other approach, regime theory is not 
immune to criticism. A key aspect in regime theory criticism is the lack 
of empirical analysis of the effectiveness of regimes (cf. Zellner 1998: 
14). He argues that this is not accidental but caused by weaknesses in 
the theoretical construct. 2 An interesting expansion of Krasner’s 
approach to regime theory is Volker Rittberger’s observable 
behavioural orientation (cf. ibid. 13). This aspect implicates that only 
those bodies should be considered which actually have an impact on 
the area it concerns and this impact should be evident. However, 
Rittberger’s criterion of observable behavioural orientation will not be 
taken into account in this thesis, as it is my belief that Krasner’s definition 
is more applicable to anti-corruption regimes in the UN context.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a comprehensive criticism on regime theory, see Zellner 1998.  
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3 Anti-corruption regimes – a historical overview 
3.1 The development of international anti-corruption regimes 
In order to understand the development of the United Nations anti-
corruption regimes, one first has to take a close look at how anti-
corruption regimes came into existence on a global scale. In his article 
“Internationalisierung von Anti-Korruptionsregimen” (Internationalisation 
of anti-corruption regimes; 2005), Holger Moroff explores how 
corruption became a concern for international relations, and also 
tracks the historical development of norm-building processes in the 
context of anti-corruption measures.  
Moroff proposes a subdivision of the process of norm-building into three 
historical stages. The focus is on the investigation of how international 
anti-corruption politics can be achieved; however, the goal is not to 
measure the efficiency but the realisation of international cooperation 
in the field. The first stage of globalisation was between 1870 and 1914, 
during which, however, no norm-building processes took place yet. The 
second stage was the phase of norm-building from 1970 onwards, and 
the last one is the stage of the implementation of norms starting around 
1990. 
In the first wave of globalisation, several major reasons for the lack of 
effort to enforce anti-corruption measures can be identified. The first is 
that corruption and bribery was a common practice in international 
business, because it was routine that entrepreneurs would bribe local 
officials to obtain contracts, and therefore it was not seen as an 
offence. Furthermore, in this golden age of imperialism, the idea that 
trade produces wealth was prevailing, and therefore successful trade 
relations were seen as one of the top priorities. Penalising tradesmen 
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who could establish working relationships with trading partners, even if it 
was by means of bribery, would have been seen as counterproductive, 
because the result was the desired one. The next reason is that the 
nations at this time were not as directly involved in commerce as it is 
the case nowadays, but the economy rather was dominated by 
private investors. Therefore transnational corruption was not seen as a 
problem the state would have to concern itself with. Another reason 
why no functioning anti-corruption procedures were introduced is that 
it would not have been possible to prosecute persons who engaged in 
corrupt actions abroad, because there was no working system of 
international judicial cooperation in place at that time. In addition to 
that, there were no international organisations yet who could have 
provided a framework to implement and execute efficient anti-
corruption measures. The last reason is that at that time, politics and 
finances were very closely interwoven, because, amongst other things, 
political influence was determined by one’s wealth. Moreover, the 
consensus was that the people who funded the state with their taxes 
were also entitled to have much more political influence than the 
people who did not contribute (cf. Moroff 2005: 445-448).  
More than fifty years and two World Wars would pass until serious 
attempts to develop international anti-corruption measures were 
undertaken. In the 1976, the involvement of top politicians of both the 
United States and Japanese governments in the Lockheed bribing 
scandal, where $1.8 million were paid to the Japanese prime minister 
by the Lockheed corporation to be assigned with an important 
commission, were discovered (cf. Mabrey 2007: 175-177). In addition, 
the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), which had uncovered 
the Lockheed scandal, exposed a number of other instances of bribery 
and corruption public officials had been involved in. To counteract the 
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loss of image produced by these scandals, the United States passed 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), under which the bribery of 
foreign public officials became a criminal offence. However, it was 
feared that the FCPA might lead to a competitive disadvantage for 
the United States, since just because US American companies could 
not (legally) continue to bribe foreign public officials, companies from 
other countries would not be stopped from doing the same, and thus 
acquire more commissions. Therefore, the United States tried to 
internationalise the FCPA by promoting the implementation of such an 
act in international organisations, such as the United Nations or the 
Organization of American States, and other industrial nations. These 
endeavours, however, proved to be ineffective. Although in the 1970s 
some efforts to put some anti-corruption measures into practice within 
international organisations were undertaken, this issue was often 
overshadowed by the arms race and the discourse of international 
security policies during the Cold War. Furthermore, it was feared that 
the more active enforcement of anti-corruption measures would be 
seen as an infringement of affairs internal to the sovereign countries – 
an issue that was especially sensitive during the Cold War. Another 
problem was that at this time it was still believed by some experts that 
corruption could have positive effects – also because often no injured 
party was immediately evident, and it was therefore assumed that one 
had reached a win-win situation (cf. Moroff 2005: 448-449). 
The United States had always been an important actor in the 
promotion and development of international anti-corruption norms. 
However, during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George W. 
Bush, Sr., the topic of international anti-corruption measures receded 
into the background which led to a stagnation of the proceedings 
within the international community. It was only under the Clinton 
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administration in the 1990s, that the fight against corruption returned to 
the agenda of international organisations. Several factors contributed 
to this renewed interest in the issue, which would ultimately lead to the 
implementation of international anti-corruption norms. Firstly, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a 
redefinition and widening of the understanding of national security, 
and corruption and its prevention became part of the discourse of 
national security once more. In addition, in this time of increased 
awareness of the problems brought on by corruption, the non-
governmental organisation “Transparency International” was founded 
in 1993, with the goal to further the fight against corruption.   
As before, the United States were crucial to the development of the 
norms, and the interaction of several factors made the fight against 
corruption especially important for them. To begin with, their direct 
investments in developing countries increased, and because in these 
countries corruption and bribery were often common practice, they 
needed to find ways to combat this problem. Furthermore, they 
established relationships with new target countries, and for instance 
became an export partner for China. In China, however, corruption 
was also widely spread, and for the United States in order to expand 
successfully, ways of fighting corruption in the target country had to be 
found. Lastly, among the big emerging sectors during the 1990s was 
also the infrastructure sector, which was an area of business where the 
contracts are commonly issued by the government itself. However, in 
many countries, especially emerging or developing countries, the 
chances of being given a contract without bribing the official in 
charge were very low. Therefore the United States urged to promote 
the development of international anti-corruption measures, in order to 
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be able to compete with investors from other countries (cf. ibid. 450-
451).  
Other aspects which contributed to the formation of international anti-
corruption measures were that not only the United States, but also other 
industrial countries increased their direct investments in, on the one 
hand, various industrial countries, but on the other hand, also in 
developing or transitioning countries. In order for these business 
relationships to be successful, corruption in the target countries had to 
be prevented. Another aspect is the increased scandalisation of 
corruption. In, for instance, the former Soviet Union countries, freedom 
of press increased, and although corruption had been very common 
before, these practices suddenly became publicly known, and 
therefore turned into scandals which needed to be addressed by the 
government. Yet another reason why anti-corruption efforts were 
increased can be found in the development of the European Union in 
the 1990s. With the removal of borders and with them, border control, in 
the Schengen area, it was at the same time easier for businesses to 
trade across borders, but it also became much easier to engage in 
transnational criminal action, corruption and money laundering among 
them. Therefore, measures to prevent this form of criminal action had to 
be found. Especially in the course of the European Eastern Enlargement 
many people were concerned that there would be a strong increase in 
criminal action, therefore ways to prevent this had to be found (cf. ibid. 
452). 
To conclude, it can be said that the success in the establishment of 
international anti-corruption norms can, amongst others, be traced 
back to the fact that from the 1990s onwards, corruption was publicly 
ostracised and also given greater importance in the media, which then 
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led to more public recognition of the detrimental effects of corruption 
(cf. ibid. 452).  
 
3.2 Overview over international anti-corruption regimes 
Although the United Nations is in a unique position as the single global 
organisation which operates on a world wide basis, other entities have 
also created their own regimes to fight corruption. In this chapter an 
overview over two regional anti-corruption regimes, namely the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption (IACA) regime of the 
Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe will be 
provided. In addition, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development as an international anti-corruption regime will be 
presented.  
The OECD has had corruption issues on its agenda since the late 1970s. 
Especially the United States were a driving force in the organisation, as 
they had already criminalised the bribery of foreign public officials in 
their Foreign Corrupt Practises Act (FCPA 1977). The first measures 
against this aspect of corruption developed by the OECD were non-
binding (cf. Jakobi 2010: 93), and the OECD “Recommendation on 
Bribery in International Business Transactions” (C(94)75/FINAL) was 
adopted in 1994. Among a number of requests for member states to 
actively take actions against bribery, it also requested the OECD’s 
Committee on International Investment and Multilateral Enterprises 
(CIME) to report on the progress of those recommendations within 
three years (Posadas 2000: 378). In 1997, the OECD received a “Revised 
Recommendation on Bribery in International Business Transactions” by 
the CIME, which again encouraged the OECD to pursue a way to a 
treaty on this topic. Six months later, the OECD member states adopted 
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the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (OECD 2011). It came into force in 
1999 and is a legally binding international instrument which is focused 
on the ‘supply side’ of the bribery transaction. 
The OECD also has a monitoring system in place called the “OECD 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions,” which 
is not only responsible of overseeing the implementation of the 
Convention, but also of the “Recommendation on Further Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions,” which 
is the OECD’s second legal instrument in the fight against corruption. 
The Working Group is composed by representatives of signatory states, 
and all signatories of the Convention have an obligation to be 
members of the Working Group (cf. Jakobi 2010: 95). This 
Recommendation was adopted in 2009, and the key difference 
between the Recommendation and the Convention is that the 
recommendation is not legally binding.  
There is also a monitoring mechanism in place, which is a peer-review 
system and is mandatory. Furthermore, states cannot block the 
publication of country reports. Those two aspects in particular probably 
make the mechanism the strongest review mechanism for a legal anti-
corruption instrument in place today.  
A pioneer among anti-corruption regimes is the Organization of 
American States (OAS). The Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption (IACA) was the first internationally binding comprehensive 
anti-corruption instrument. It was signed in 1996 and entered into force 
in 1997. Until now, 33 nations have ratified the Convention and 34 
signed it (Barbados has not ratified the Convention yet)3 (OAS 2011). 
This convention came into existence at an uncharacteristically fast 
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pace for an international instrument. In December 1994, the OAS 
agreed to commit to tackle corruption with a new instrument in the 
“Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action”. In March 1996, not even 
two years later, the Declaration the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption was adopted in Venezuela and opened for signature (cf. 
Posadas 2000: 382-383). There was no form of review mechanism 
included in the original convention, but was later included in the 
Resolution AG/RES. 1784 titled “Mechanism for follow-up of 
implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption” 
in 2001. This document set the basis for the Mecanismo de Seguimiento 
de su implementación (MESICIC). The participation in the mechanism is 
voluntary and has currently 31 member states, thus covering 94% of the 
member states to the IACA (the two exceptions are St. Lucia and 
Dominica), and 89% of all member states of the OAS.  
One of the most effective Anti-Corruption Regimes in existence today is 
the Council of Europe. It all began at the Malta Conference in 1994, 
where it was recommended to pursue a common anti-corruption 
strategy which could include an international convention (Jakobi 2010: 
96). The Council of Europe, although it is limited in range in comparison 
to the United Nations, is a powerful instrument in its region, covering 47 
nations. Its key norms are the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 
and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption. Although one can say 
that other anti-corruption regimes are more comprehensive, especially 
its “Twenty guiding principles against corruption” (CoE Res (97) 24) 
provide clear guidelines for member states. They form a crucial basis for 
the regime’s monitoring institution GRECO (Group of States against 
Corruption) (cf. Hofmann 2011: 98-106). GRECO was established in 1999 
and has at the moment 49 member states, including the United States, 
who are a signatory of the Criminal Law convention.  
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Resolution (99) 5, defines the function of GRECO as follows:  
• i. monitor the observance of the Guiding Principles for the Fight 
against Corruption as adopted by the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe on 6 November 1997; 
• ii. monitor the implementation of international legal instruments to 
be adopted in pursuance of the Programme of Action against 
Corruption, in conformity with the provisions contained in such 
instruments; (Res (99) 5 art. 2) 
An important development happened in 2003 when the Council 
adopted the “Additional Protocol to the Crime Law Convention on 
Corruption” (CoE 2003) as it criminalises the bribery of judges of 
arbitration courts as well as members of a jury (cf. Hofmann 2011: 106). 
As of now, 28 States have ratified the additional protocol.4 As a side 
note, the Conventions, as well as GRECO itself, are not only open to 
member states of the Council of Europe, but to all nations.   
The differences between those three regimes are immense. At a 
special position, we have the pioneer of anti-corruption instruments, the 
OAS’s IACA, which marks a first attempt in creating a legally binding 
international instrument. However, as it one of the oldest regimes on the 
issue, it lacks some crucial features, especially an efficient review 
mechanism.  
This review mechanism is present at the anti-corruption regime of the 
Council of Europe, as GRECO has an elaborate review mechanism 
which has already undergone three evaluation rounds according to 
the rules of procedure (Greco (2010) 9E) and the fourth evaluation 
round is due to start in 2012.  
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The significant difference between regimes of the OAS and the Council 
of Europe and the OECD lies in the fact that the OECD almost 
exclusively deals with one aspect of corruption, namely the bribery of 
officials. Furthermore, compared to the other two regimes, the OECD 
provides the best review mechanism in order to ensure the 
implementation of its norms. We can therefore argue that the OECD is 
an important and strong anti-corruption regime regarding one aspect 
of corruption.  
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4 The United Nations 
After the League of Nations had failed to prevent another global war, 
the Allied Nations started to develop ideas on a new global 
organisation during World War II. This organisation would ideally be able 
to prevent another war of the dimensions of either World War I or II, and 
the project was started by analysing why the League of Nations had 
been unsuccessful in their efforts.  
The first agreement that drafted the duties of a future global 
organisation was the Atlantic Charter, which was presented by Winston 
Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the fall of 1941 (cf. Gareis and 
Varwick 2006: 23). However, it did not concern itself with a possible 
organisation directly, but rather hinted at it by stating “pending the 
establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security” 
(Atlantic Charter 1941 §8).  
The Declaration by United Nations signed on New Year’s Day 1942 was 
the agreement of 26 states. Not only was it an agreement to fight 
against the Axis Powers, but also the states committed “to a common 
program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration 
[…] known as the Atlantic Charter” (Declaration 1942). 
Other key Declarations were agreed upon at the Moscow Conference 
and the Teheran Conference in 1943. The preparations for a worldwide 
organisation became more concrete at the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference in 1944, where an expert meeting agreed on a number of 
proposals, including a possible organisation structure. At the Yalta 
Conference in 1945, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed upon the 
voting system of the Security Council, including the veto-right for the 
permanent members (cf. Cede 1999: 6).  
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At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San 
Francisco in 1945, fifty nations spent two months drafting the United 
Nations Charter which was signed on June 26, 1945. It entered into 
force on October 24, 1945, after all five permanent members and a 
majority of members ratified the charter (cf. ibid. 7). 
This event marked an important point in history, as for the first time, all 
great powers of the world were part of an international organisation 
dedicated to peacekeeping.  
According to the UN Charter, the General Assembly, the Security 
Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the 
International Court of Justice and the Secretariat were established as 
the six principal organs of the UN (UN Charter chapter III art. 7 §1). The 
Trusteeship Council, the only organ of the United Nations to have 
completed its assignment, suspended its operation in 1994 (cf. 
Trauttmansdorff 1999: 41). The future of the Trusteeship Council remains 
undecided, as it could either be completely eliminated, or its function 
might be changed. As a result, the UN effectively has only five active 
principal organs.   
The composition, functions and powers of the General Assembly are 
described in Chapter IV of the UN Charter. The General Assembly 
consists of all Member States of the UN (cf. UN Charter chapter IV art. 9 
§1). According to article 10 of the Charter, the General Assembly may 
concern itself with “any matters within the scope of the present Charter 
or relating to the powers and functions of any organs.” Resolutions of 
the General Assembly generally non-binding, yet decisions of 
budgetary or administrative issues are binding (cf. Trauttmansdorff 1999: 
29). The annual meeting of the General Assembly traditionally begins in 
September. However, special sessions can be scheduled if requested 
by the UN Security Council or the majority of UN members. Furthermore, 
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Emergency Special Sessions, which meet within 24 hours of the request, 
can be convened if a majority of the members of the General 
Assembly, or nine members of the Security Council call for it (cf. ibid. 
30). According to chapter IV, article 18 of the UN Charter, each 
member of the General Assembly has one vote, and decisions on 
important issues need a two-thirds majority. Those questions include 
recommendations with respect to maintenance of international 
peace and security, the election of the non-permanent 
members of the Security Council, the election of the members of 
the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of 
the Trusteeship Council […], the admission of new Members to 
the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of 
membership [and] the expulsion of Members (Chapter IV, art. 18, 
§2). 
All other decisions are made by a majority, however de facto most 
decisions are made by consensus. The General Assembly is assisted by 
six main committees, namely the Disarmament and International 
Security Committee, the Economic and Financial Committee, the 
Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee, the Special Political and 
Decolonization Committee, the Administrative and Budgetary 
Committee and the Legal Committee (cf. Trauttmansdorff 1999: 31). 
Additional subsidiary organs of the General Assembly include a number 
of Working Groups, Commissions and Councils. 
The Security Council originally consisted of six non-permanent members 
and five permanent members, namely the Republic of China, France, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America (UN Charter 
chapter V, art. 23, §1). Those permanent members also have the power 
of veto and can thus singlehandedly block a decision. Since 1971, the 
People’s Republic of China is a member of the Security Council (cf. 
A/RES/2758), and the Russian Federation entered the Security Council 
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as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in 1965 the 
number of non-permanent member states was increased in order to 
achieve a better distribution among geographical regions (cf. Gareis 
and Varwick 2006: 44). The main function of the Security Council is to 
maintain peace. The decisions of the Security Council are binding if 
they fall under chapter VII of the UN Charter, and nine of the fifteen 
members of the Security Council have to be in favour in order to make 
a decision on substantive matters. Although the UN Charter states that 
decisions have to made by a majority of affirmative votes, including all 
permanent members (cf. UN Charter chapter V art. 27 §3), in practice 
a majority of votes is sufficient, even if a permanent member abstains 
from voting, or is absent (cf. Trauttmansdorff 1999: 35). Decisions on 
procedural matters need a majority vote.  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Den Haag consists of 15 
independent judges. It is responsible for settling legal disputes which 
are submitted by states (therefore, individuals or private organisations 
cannot call upon the ICJ). In addition it is an advisor in legal matters for 
other UN entities (cf. Gareis and Varwick 2006: 48-49).  
The Secretariat is composed of the Secretary-General and his staff. The 
Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the basis 
of a recommendation by the Security Council. The Secretary-General is 
appointed for a five-year term, which is renewable without limitations, 
however, in practice the position is renewed only once. The tasks of the 
Secretariat include servicing the other principal organs of the UN, as 
well as documenting the work of the organisation and reporting it to 
the General Assembly on an annual basis. Additionally, it can convene 
extraordinary sessions of the General Assembly (cf. Trauttmansdorff 
1999: 41-45). 
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The Secretariat includes the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, 
a great number of offices and departments, including the UN Offices 
Away From Headquarters in Geneva, Nairobi and Vienna, and most 
important for the topic of corruption, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC is structured into an 
Independent Evaluation Unit and four Divisions, including the Division for 
Treaty Affairs, which itself is composed of the Organized Crime and Illicit 
Trafficking Branch, Terrorism Prevention Branch and the Corruption and 
Economic Crime Branch.   
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) consists of 54 member 
states (originally only 18, 27 since 1965, and 54 since 1971), distributed 
among the regional groups as following: 14 members from Africa, 11 
from Asia, 10 from Latin America, 13 from Western European an other 
States, and six from eastern European States. In principle, all five 
permanent members of the Security Council are part of the ECOSOC 
without interruption (cf. Trauttmansdorff 1999: 37). The relationship of 
the ECOSOC and the General Assembly is a hierarchical one. 
According to article 66 of the UN Charter, the ECOSOC is under the 
authority of the General Assembly, and can therefore be seen as an 
auxiliary body of the General Assembly (cf. Verdross and Simma 1984: 
§168). Since 1991, the ECOSOC only meets once a year instead of 
twice. At the meetings also member states of the UN who are not 
members of the ECOSOC at that point are allowed as observers (cf. 
Gareis and Varwick 2006: 47). 
The bulk of the work of the ECOSOC is carried out by a number of 
subsidiary bodies, which include five regional commissions, three 
standing committees and a number of other committees, a changing 
number of ad hoc bodies, and most importantly its currently nine 
functional commissions, which namely are the Statistical Commission, 
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the Commission on Population and Development, the Commission for 
Social Development, Commission on Narcotics and Drugs, the 
Commission on the Status of Women, the Commission on Science and 
Technology For Development, the Commission on Sustainable 
Development, the United Nations Forum on Forests and the Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.  
Furthermore, a great number of NGOs have a consultative status with 
the ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies. While it started out by including 
41 NGOs in 1948, nowadays more than 3000 NGOs have a consultative 
status (cf. Keppler-Schlesinger 1999: 255). According to ECOSOC 
Resolution E/1996/31, the NGOs have to meet a number of criteria in 
order to be granted consultative status. Among others, the NGOs’ 
objectives have to conform to the UN Charter, and, if possible, the 
NGOs should be equally distributed among all Regional Groups (cf. 
E/1996/31 part 1, §5), and NGOs from developing and transition states 
should be encouraged to become actively involved (cf. ibid §6-7). 
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5 Anti-Corruption Regimes of the United Nations 
In this chapter, first a chronological overview over the anti-corruption 
efforts of the four UN bodies is provided. This is deemed necessary as 
the decisions and the development is essential to determine the norms 
and rules of those bodies. Secondly, the UN body is described 
according to the characteristics of a regime as presented in chapter 2.  
 
5.1 The Crime Congress 
5.1.1 Crime Congress Overview 
Since 1955, the United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice has been held quinquennially in various cities around 
the world, and its first meeting was held in Geneva under the title 
“United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders.” The name has been changed for the 
eleventh Congress, and is now “United Nations Congress on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice.” The original title shows the focus on 
prisoners and the environment of correctional facilities of the early 
congresses. As was stated in the course of the Eleventh Crime 
Congress, the main objective is the setting of standards and the 
provision of guidelines regarding the prevention of crime and criminal 
justice. Every congress has a theme around which most discussions and 
sessions are arranged (cf. BKK/CP/10).  
The first significant discussion of corruption in the course of the Crime 
Congress took place in Kyoto at the Fourth Congress in 1970 in 
discussions on Social Defence Policies in relation to development 
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planning, especially in the context of technical assistance in crime 
prevention. A point of criticism was the limited view of crime, which 
disregarded, among other things, corruption (A/CONF.43/1 §139). 
This discussion was then resumed and more closely examined at the 
Fifth Congress in Geneva in 1975. Under Agenda item 5 Changes in 
Forms and Dimensions of Criminality – Transnational and National, the 
topic of Crime as business: organized crime, white-collar crime and 
corruption was closely inspected. It was mentioned that especially 
representatives of developing states stated that corruption, among 
other new forms of crime, were a threat to the economic development 
at the state of the nation itself. In addition, problems of definition were 
discussed in the paper, as well as the lack of research on the topic. It 
was concluded that “special studies on corruption and smuggling in 
view of their extremely detrimental effect on national economies and 
international trade, particularly in developing countries” (A/CONF.56/10 
§58(e)) should be conducted (ibid. §51-59 and 301-371). Furthermore, 
the Congress advised that all parties involved with criminal policies 
should  
develop greater awareness of the significance of economic 
crimes, particularly of corruption and damage to environment 
within a developmental context and of the effects of such crimes 
on the development process. (ibid. §24(i))  
Corruption was also discussed under the aspect of social 
consequences, as it was stated that “the fear of crime, together with 
corruption, had in some countries resulted in social, economic and 
political instability” (ibid. §318). Corruption was now also viewed as 
being largely damaging to developing countries and it was agreed 
upon that “criminal codes should identify those crimes which had a 
bearing on the developmental process – for example, corruption […] 
with appropriate alternative strategies designed to reduce the effect 
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of such crimes” and that as a result “economic growth could be 
accelerated” (ibid. §349). To sum up, corruption was generally viewed 
as a big problem that had to be tackled internationally. It was 
recognized that it was a problem which existed in the developing, as 
well as, the developed world. However, its detrimental effects were 
considered to be more damaging for developing countries. In addition 
the lack of information about corruption became clear, and thus the 
Congress called for more research, data and gathering of knowledge. 
At the Sixth Congress, which was held in Caracas in 1980, the topic of 
corruption was dealt with in agenda item 5 Crime and the abuse of 
power: offences and offenders beyond the reach of the law. In the 
working paper New perspectives in crime prevention and criminal 
justice and development: The role of international co-operation, the 
Secretariat presented the problem of international trade-partners of 
“developing countries in particular” (A/CONF.87/10 §59), who “appear 
to operate outside and above the law” (ibid.) by affecting national 
economy through corruption, among other things. In the working paper 
Crime and the abuse of power: offences and offenders beyond the 
reach of the law, the Secretariat pointed out that one of the major 
problems of prosecuting the abuse of power is the unclear line 
between “what is legal and ethical, what is legal and unethical and 
what is illegal and unethical” (A/CONF.87/6 §27). In addition, the figure 
of the public official was taken under scrutiny, and the problems that 
might arise when a public official abuses his power, as he might be 
“protected, or because the act by its very nature is hard to detect and 
prosecute” (ibid. §31) was discussed. The role of the public, and 
especially also that of the media was put at the centre of discussion, 
although the question whether the increased medial presence of 
corruption would trigger a change remained open (ibid. §34). The most 
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striking fact about this document is, however, that the issue of a 
possible positive effect of corruption for developing societies, which 
was promoted at that time by some researches, was dealt with and this 
presumption was also criticised (ibid. §48). Among others, negative 
consequences of corruption, which affect the society as a whole – 
such as increased living costs or the loss of social cohesion and the trust 
in the law and public institutions – are highlighted (ibid. §49). The 
document also provides the first request for “minimum rules” for 
economic crime and “guidelines and norms aimed at the prevention 
and control of transnational abuses of economic power” (ibid. §88). 
The Congress agreed on a number of issues which were considered to 
be urgent, such as the need to “gather and exchange information on 
the various aspects of offence relating to the abuse of power”, “to 
broaden and improve machinery for combating illegal abuses of 
power” and “to strengthen international co-operation […] in policy 
formulation and the implementation of effective action strategies 
particularly as regards economic crimes” (ibid. chapter I, C, 5. (1), (3), 
(5)). Although at this congress the discussion was focused on corruption 
in developing states, as well as corruption in the context of economic 
crime, the issue itself was still further developed in several respects. The 
term public official, as well as the phrase the abuse of power, had 
entered the language of the Congress and were frequently used in 
documents. The latter is, as discussed in Chapter 1.2, an integral part for 
every definition of corruption. Lastly, as already mentioned, the request 
for minimum rules can be considered to be a significant step in the 
Congress’s efforts to combat corruption. 
At the Seventh Congress in Milan in 1985 there was no longer a 
discussion whether the negative impact of corruption was stronger 
than any possible positive effects, but at that time a common 
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agreement that all new forms of crimes, including economic crime and 
corruption, had a “profoundly negative impact […] upon socio-
economic development” (A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1) had been formed. 
Especially its severe consequences in developing countries were 
stressed as “national development programmes were being seriously 
hindered by the proliferation of economic crime such as 
embezzlement, fraud, […] rampant corruption, bribery and abuses of 
economic power” (ibid. §61). Under Agenda item 3 New dimensions of 
criminality and crime prevention in the context of development: 
challenges for the future, national and transnational economic crime, 
together with illicit drug trafficking, terrorism and international 
organized crime were not only identified as new emerging forms of 
crime (ibid. §55), but also as being especially harmful (ibid. chapter 1, 
sect. B, annex, §8). The list of “Guiding Principles for Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice in the Context of Development and a new 
International Economic Order” provided guidelines for states regarding 
economic crimes. It requested states to provide training for judges and 
officials in dealing with the investigation, prosecution, and the 
prevention of economic crime to ensure that the penalty for economic 
crimes were equal in severity to the penalty of conventional crimes, 
and in addition, to grade penalties in a way that they would be equally 
exemplary for wealthy and poor offenders (ibid. chapter 1, sect. B, 
annex, §8-§11). In the broader context of the Seventh Congress, 
corruption, bribery or other closely linked offences were not dealt with 
in such depth but there was a stronger focus on economic crime in 
general. Interestingly enough, however, it was pointed out in a report 
by the Secretariat titled “New dimensions of criminality and crime 
prevention in the context of development: challenges for the future – 
Second United Nations Survey of Crime Trends, Operations of Criminal 
Justice Systems and Crime Prevention Strategies”, that there was an 
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apparent discrepancy in the reported data among economic crimes. 
While “white-collar crime”, including fraud and embezzlement, was 
reported as frequently as conventional crime, data on corruption and 
bribery was provided by fewer countries (A/CONF.121/18 §51). This 
underlines the problem that it is still a problem to acquire reliable figures 
on the instances of corruption.  
For the Eighth Crime Congress, which was held in 1990 in Havana, the 
Secretariat prepared a working paper titled Crime prevention and 
criminal justice in the context of development: realities and 
perspectives of international co-operation (A/CONF.144/8 and 
A/CONF.144/8/Corr.1). It expressed concern that corruption had, 
although present in all societies, more severe consequences in 
developing countries, but also pointed out that in some cases 
corruption is “linked to survival” (A/CONF.144/8 §20). The paper also 
disagreed with the widely spread opinion of the earlier decades, that 
corruption could have a positive effect on development and it was 
argued that “experience has shown the opposite: funds go to foreign 
banks in hard currencies and are used for personal enrichment” (ibid.). 
International cooperation was strongly encouraged in the paper, as 
well as preventive measures against money laundering and provisions 
for the “confiscation of the proceeds of corrupt practices” (ibid. §25). 
Furthermore, the Congress discussed a manual on “Practical measures 
against Corruption” (A/CONF.144/5), which covered a broad number 
of matters connected to corruption, including penal law issues and its 
limits, suggestions for the investigation of corrupt officials and provisions 
for the forfeiture of funds, as well as property acquired from corrupt 
practices. It is noteworthy that already at this early stage of the UN 
process of introducing soft law, an important distinction between 
anonymous informants, who would nowadays be considered to be a 
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type of whistleblowers, and witnesses, is made. This is later also 
apparent in the UNCAC, where it is distinguished between “reporting 
persons” and “witnesses” (cf. Djokic 2011: 170). In the manual, 
whistleblowers are listed under “Other Sources”, and it is recommended 
that they “should only be considered as investigative intelligence of 
unknown reliability” (A/CONF.144/5 §19). The Congress also adopted a 
resolution on “Corruption in Government” (A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 
chapter I, sect. C, res. 7). In this resolution the Congress recommended 
a number of measures for the prevention of corrupt practises, such as 
giving high priorities to anti-corruption strategies, increasing public 
awareness, and improving financial regulations (ibid. chapter I, sect. C, 
res. 7 § 1(a)-1(e)). It also requested the Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice Branch to draft an international code of conduct for public 
officials for the Ninth Congress.  
At the Ninth Congress in Cairo in 1995, a special session was held on 
“Experiences in practical measures aimed at combating corruption 
involving public officials” (A/CONF.169/16/Rev.1 chapter V, sect. A). 
This discussion gave the Congress a chance to exchange opinions and 
experiences beyond the scope suggested in the title, as, for example, 
the definition of “corruption”, or the occurrence of corruption outside 
of the political sector were also covered (ibid. chapter V, sect. A 248 & 
251). Furthermore, the Congress adopted a resolution on “International 
cooperation and practical technical assistance for strengthening the 
rule of law: promoting the United Nations crime prevention and criminal 
justice programme” (ibid. chapter I, res.1). In this resolution, the 
Congress requested further cooperation of its member states in 
“identifying specific measures against corruption, bribery and the 
abuse of power,” as well as further international cooperation on a 
number of crime issues, and called on member states to establish 
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monitoring mechanisms for economic crime, including corruption (ibid. 
chapter I, res.1 chapter II §8, §4 & §11). The active use of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements and the pursuit of further research in areas 
such as transnational organised crime, economic crime, environmental 
crime and corruption were also encouraged (ibid. chapter I, res.1 
chapter I §4).5 
At the Tenth Congress in 2000 in Vienna, the Congress adopted the 
“Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of 
the Twenty-first Century” (A/Conf.187/4/Rev.3). In this declaration the 
Congress called for further efforts against new forms of crime, and, in 
paragraph 16 calls for a legal instrument to fight corruption 
“independent[ly] of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime”. 6  Furthermore, the Congress 
considered issues of corruption under Agenda item 4 titled International 
cooperation in combating transnational crime: new challenges in the 
twenty-first century. It was noted that for an anti-corruption strategy to 
be successful, four requirements had to be met, namely economic 
development, democratic reform, a strong civil society and rule of law 
(A/CONF.187/9 §45). Moreover, the connection between corruption 
and other aspects of organized crime was stressed (ibid. §30), and the 
Congress once more called for an international legal instrument 
against corruption, but in this case it was left open whether the 
instrument should be ancillary to the UNTOC, or of an independent 
nature (ibid. §68). At the workshop titled “Combating Corruption”, the 
discussion was focused on deliberating and suggesting different 
measures to fight corruption (A/ONF.187/15 §152-§160).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  For clarification: The Resolution (A/CONF.169/16/Rev.1 chapter I, res.1) does 
enumerate corruption independently of economic crime in chapter 1 §4 but uses it as 
part of economic crime in chapter II §11.  
6 Corruption is covered in the UNTOC in Art. 8 “Criminalization of corruption”.  
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At the Eleventh Congress, which was held in 2005 in Bangkok, 
Corruption was dealt with under substantive item 3. In addition, 
corruption-related issues such as economic and financial crime were 
considered under Agenda item 4 (A/CONF.203/PM.1). It was 
highlighted that corruption had an effect on a wide range of areas, 
among them political stability and the economy, but also that it 
promoted other crimes such as money-laundering or terrorism 
(A/CONF. 203/18 §157). At the Congress the UNCAC was a highly 
discussed topic, especially the innovative inclusion of asset recovery, as 
it was seen as a tool for helping developing countries in particular, 
which could profit from this aspect of the Convention (ibid. §161). The 
Convention was praised as a “milestone in the efforts of the 
international community to establish an international legal framework 
against corruption” (ibid. §169). Another item of discussion was the 
inclusion of external entities in the fight against corruption, such as the 
civil society, non-governmental organizations, the media or the private 
sector. Especially the last was considered to be of high importance, as 
a great number of enterprises and companies conducted business in 
developing countries and could have a great effect there. It is 
interesting to see that the Congress also felt the need to encourage the 
“involvement of women in designing, implementing and monitoring 
anti-corruption strategies” (ibid. §162). The Congress also addressed the 
matter of the ratification process of the Convention, as it was seen to 
be problematic that only developing states had ratified the 
Convention at that point in time, and it was felt that this might have 
negative consequences, therefore member states were urged to 
accelerate the process (ibid. §158). 
At the Twelfth Congress in Salvador in 2010, for the first time in years 
corruption was neither an item on the agenda (A/CONF.213/1), nor 
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appeared in a chapter title in the official report of the Congress 
(A/CONF.213/18). However, subjects that are closely related to 
corruption, such as money laundering were discussed, yet no 
substantial discussion on corruption was undertaken. States who had 
not yet done so were merely encouraged to sign and ratify the 
Convention and it was stressed as being an important legal instrument 
also to fight other crimes, such as terrorism (A/CONF.213/5). 
An interesting fact to consider is the development of the categorization 
of corruption, and corruption related issues, in the course of the forty 
years the Congress dealt with this matter. At the beginning, corruption 
was merely mentioned to be absent from the discussion, and it was 
then frequently subsumed under economic crime, or white collar crime. 
We can see this from formulations like “economic crimes, including 
corruption.” From the Tenth Congress onward, however, corruption was 
generally considered to be an issue in its own right, and other 
economic crimes, such as fraud, embezzlement and money laundering 
were considered to be related crimes.  
We can see that the importance of the issue of corruption in the 
context of the Congress has increased steadily from the Fourth until the 
Eighth Congress, but has since then given way to new emerging issues, 
such as cyber criminality, and slowly corruption started to become less 
present at the Congress, as the CCPCJ, the UNTOC and the UNCAC 
were formed and have taken over most of the substantial work in this 
area. This is underlined by the fact that no discussion on corruption took 
place at the Twelfth Congress. It is interesting to notice that the “sister-
issue” with the “sister-convention”, namely organized crime, has stayed 
on the agenda. One could argue that one reason for this is the lack of 
a comprehensive review mechanism. Furthermore, transnational 
organised crime is a constantly and rapidly changing issue, thus the 
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topic has not been entirely subsumed under the Convention 
mechanisms.  
 
5.1.2 The Crime Congress as a regime 
The guiding principle of the Crime Congress is “standard-setting in 
crime prevention and criminal justice” (BKK/CP/10), which includes the 
fight against corruption. 
Its key norms regarding corruption are the resolutions and declarations 
which were developed and adopted by the Congress. The most 
important among them are “Corruption in Government” 
(A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 chapter I, sect. C, res. 7) and the “Vienna 
Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the 
Twenty-first Century” (A/CONF.187/4/Rev.3).   
The rules of the Crime Congress regarding corruption are rather widely 
spread, as we not only have to consider the content of the resolutions 
by the Congress itself, but, as the it works closely together with the 
ECOSOC and the General Assembly, the resolutions adopted in those 
two bodies have to be taken into consideration as well.   
Regarding the decision-making processes, this aspect of the regime is 
performed by the Congress at its sessions. However, as the CCPCJ is 
preparatory body for the Congress, it must also be included into the 
decision-making process of the Crime Congress. Furthermore, as the 
General Assembly and the ECOSOC adopt resolutions which directly 
impact the Crime Congress, they also have to be considered to be 
part of the decision-making process. 
The impact of the Crime Congress is more difficult to elaborate upon 
than it is the case with other bodies in the fight against corruption. The 
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Crime Congress prefaces its report and all resolutions with the words 
“We the States Members of the United Nations,” indicating that the 
decisions and agreements which were established in the course of 
those congresses were agreed upon by all members of the United 
Nations. Before the Tenth Congress, the common phrase was “The (1st-
9th) United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders”. This indicates that especially from the 10th 
Congress onwards, by using the phrase “We the states members of the 
united nations”, the Crime Congress viewed itself as being 
representative for all 193 UN member States.  
Therefore, the standard setting of the Crime Congress, and its guiding 
principles, although they are not binding in any way, have a de facto 
global reach. However, as it is merely a standard setting institution 
which does not have any sort of review or follow-up mechanism, it is 
nearly impossible to track whether its rules regarding corruption have 
been implemented. 
However, some rules, such as the call for an independent legal 
instrument to fight corruption at the Tenth Congress 
(A/CONF.187/4/Rev.3 §16) have been fulfilled, at least by those 
member states which are also States Parties to the UNCAC.  
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5.2 The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice 
5.2.1 CCPCJ Overview 
The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) is a 
functional commission of the Economic and Social Council, and it was 
established in 1992 by the ECOSOC in the ECOSOC resolution 1992/1 
(E/RES/1992/1) and replaced the Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control, which was dissolved in the same resolution.  
The CCPCJ is the governing body of the UNODC, it approves the 
budget of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Fund, and 
also works closely together with the Crime Congress, as the Commission 
takes on follow-up measures from Congress decisions in between 
congresses. It is composed of representatives of forty governments 
elected by the ECOSOC for a three-year term and distributed among 
the five regional groups. In the ECOSOC Resolution E/RES/1992/22 it is 
stated that the Commission should be responsible for “facilitating the 
planning, coordination and implementation of practical activities in the 
field of crime prevention and criminal justice” (ibid. part I §1). In 
addition, the Commission was requested to work together with national 
agencies, non-governmental organizations and other institutions on a 
number of activities. It was also decided that until 1996, the Commission 
should focus, among others, on “[n]ational and transnational crime, 
organized crime, economic crime, including money laundering” (ibid. 
part VI §1 (a)). Although corruption is not explicitly mentioned in this 
decision, it must be assumed that this decision was made at a time 
when corruption was still generally subsumed under the under the 
subject of economic crime within the Congress. 
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During a session, the work of the Commission is generally split into two 
parts which take place simultaneously. In the plenary sessions the 
official agenda and other issues are discussed. In the Committee of the 
Whole (COW) the delegations consider draft resolutions, which are 
then submitted to the plenary for adoption towards the end of the 
session. Although de jure the adoption of a resolution does not need to 
be unanimous, the CCPCJ has a de facto policy of only adopting 
resolutions unanimously. This aspect of the decision-making process of 
the CCPCJ is also present at the other functioning Commission of the 
ECOSOC that meets in Vienna, namely the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs (CND). This phenomenon is commonly called the Vienna Spirit or 
Spirit of Vienna. 
 
Sessions 1-3 
At its first session in 1992, the Commission approached the topic of 
corruption mainly in the context of organized crime. Corruption was 
dealt with under the draft resolution II on Organized Crime and it was 
stated in the 12th preambular paragraph that it must be a priority to 
combat the corruption of public officials (E/CN.15/1992/7). In annex I of 
the session report it was asserted that efforts against transnational 
organised crime should find means for combating the abuse of power 
by public officials, as well as for other corrupt behaviour. Furthermore, 
law enforcement, as well as judges and prosecutors should be trained 
in fighting different areas of transnational organised crime, including 
corruption (ibid. annex I §7(k) & (m)). The lack of information on 
corruption was also mentioned, and therefore governments were 
encouraged to generate knowledge in the field of corruption. In 
general, it is noteworthy that during the first session of the Commission, 
corruption was almost exclusively dealt with under the aspect of 
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organised crime and is not treated separately in any operative 
paragraph of any of the resolutions.  
At the second session, the Commission, amongst other topics, had the 
responsibility to carry out the preparations for the Ninth Crime Congress, 
and in this context it was agreed to have a one-day discussion on 
corruption at the Congress (E/CN.15/1993/9, chapter I, sect A, res III, 
§9). Although corruption was a topic that was present in various 
plenary sessions, it still remained in the broader context of organised 
crime.  
The first time corruption was dealt with in a different context, namely 
the smuggling of illegal migrants, was at the third session of the 
Commission. There it was stated in preambular paragraph 9 that the 
smuggling of illegal migrants can trigger official corruption 
(E/CN.15/1994/12 chapter I, sect A, draft res III). Furthermore, as a result 
of a plenary session on corruption, the Commission once more 
recommended to include the topic at the Ninth Congress.  
 
Sessions 4-7 
The first draft resolution on corruption was agreed upon at the fourth 
session in 1995 and it was titled “Action against corruption” 
(E/CN.15/1995/13). On the one hand, the requests addressed to the 
Secretary-General to “study the effects of anti-corruption strategies” 
(ibid. chapter I, sect B, draft res VII §9) and to inform the Commission on 
the implementation of this resolution (ibid. §10) in two years time were 
covered. On the other hand, it urged states to take a broad number of 
measures against corruption, including “to develop and implement 
specific and comprehensive anti-corruption strategies” (ibid. §1), to 
“increase their capacity for the prevention, detection, investigation 
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and prosecution of corrupt practices” (ibid. §2), and to “increase and 
improve international cooperation for the prevention and control of 
corruption” (ibid. §3). This resolution was drafted for adoption by the 
ECOSOC and was later adopted by the General Assembly. 
At the subsequent session, the Commission submitted a follow-up 
resolution, also titled “Action against corruption” (E/CN.15/1996/24 
chapter I, sect. A, draft Res. I), as well as the “United Nations 
Declaration on Crime and Public Security” (ibid. chapter I, sect. A, draft 
Res. II) with a request to be recommended for adoption by the General 
Assembly by the ECOSOC. The resolution requested the Secretary-
General to “continue collecting information” (ibid. §4), to provide 
“assistance to requesting Member States” (ibid. §9), “intensify his efforts 
to closely cooperate with other entities of the United Nations system” 
(ibid. §8) and “to elaborate an implementation plan” together with 
“relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations” 
(ibid. §5), which should then be submitted to the Commission at the 
next session. Furthermore, states were urged to “consider problems 
posed by the international aspects of corrupt practices” (ibid. §7). 
In addition to this, also the United Nations Declaration on Crime and 
Public Security entailed an article on corruption (Article 10). There it is 
stated that there is an agreement among member states to “combat 
and prohibit corruption and bribery,” and that therefore concrete 
measures in the area of international cooperation should be 
developed. The declaration was adopted by the General Assembly in 
Resolution A/RES/51/60.  
The Commission also considered a report of the Secretary-General 
titled “Review of Priority Themes – Action against corruption.“ The report 
summarised comments from governments regarding a draft of the 
“international code of conduct for public office holders” 
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(E/CN.15/1996/5.) and provided suggestions for further steps the 
Commission could take, including the request to adopt the draft.   
The momentum kept going, and at the sixth session of the Commission 
in 1997 another draft resolution on corruption was adopted, that time, 
however, with a different focus. The resolution was titled “International 
cooperation against corruption and bribery in international commercial 
transactions” (E/CN.15/1997/21 chapter I, sect. A, draft res. IV), and 
urged states, among other things, to “criminalize […] the bribery of 
public office holders of other States in international commercial 
transactions,” to “prevent and combat bribery and corruption”, and to 
“develop and implement standards of good governance” (ibid. §3). 
The resolution was submitted to the ECOSOC for recommendation for 
the adoption by the General Assembly, and it was adopted as General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/52/87.  
At the seventh session the commission drafted and adopted a draft 
resolution titled “Action against corruption” (E/CN.15/1998/11 chapter I, 
sect B, draft res I), which dealt with the manual “International Review of 
Criminal Policy” and asked the Secretary-General to add a passage 
referring to “recent developments in combating corruption“ (ibid. §1).  
  
Sessions 8-10  
At the eighth session of the Commission a number of far-reaching draft 
resolutions were put forward to be recommended by the ECOSOC for 
adoption by the General Assembly. Among them was draft resolution II 
“Draft United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and the draft protocols thereto” (E/CN.15/1999/12), which dealt 
with corruption under article 8 “criminalization of corruption” (UNTOC 
2004, art. 8). 
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A draft resolution titled “An effective international legal instrument 
against corruption” (E/CN.15/2000/7 chapter I, sect. A, draft res. III) was 
negotiated at the ninth session of the Commission in 2000 and 
addressed to the General Assembly. The resolution clearly states that 
• an effective international legal instrument against corruption, 
independent of the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Crime is desirable, (ibid. §1) 
• [decides] to establish an ad hoc committee for the negotiation 
of such an instrument to start its work (ibid. §7) 
At the tenth session of the Commission a draft resolution was 
negotiated for adoption by the ECOSOC titled “Strengthening 
international cooperation in preventing and combating the transfer of 
funds of illicit origin, derived from acts of corruption including the 
laundering of funds, and in returning such funds” 
(E/CN.15/2001/13/Rev.1 chapter I, sect. B, draft res. III). This resolution 
requested to include, among others, the following aspects of the 
discussions on a new legal instrument against corruption (cf. ibid. §1): 
• Strengthening international cooperation in preventing and 
combating the transfer of funds of illicit origin, including the 
laundering of funds of illicit act and promoting ways and means 
of enabling the return of such funds (ibid. §1a) 
• Developing the measures necessary to ensure that those working 
in […] financial institutions contribute to the prevention of the 
transfer of funds of illicit origin or derived from acts of corruption 
(ibid. §1b) 
• Defining funds derived from acts of corruption as proceeds of 
crime and establishing that an act of corruption may be a 
predicate offence in relation to money-laundering (ibid. §1c). 
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The resolution was adopted by the ECOSOC under resolution 2001/13 
(E/2001/13/).  
Furthermore, a thematic discussion on the worldwide measures against 
corruption, titled “Progress made in global action against corruption” 
(E/CN.15/2001/13/Rev.1 chapter II), was held. The deliberations were 
split into two main topics, firstly, on effective action against corruption 
and secondly, on asset recovery. At the former, states deliberated 
upon issues of the inclusion of the civil society and the private sector, 
but also on the need for a reformed cultural acceptance of corruption, 
as well as the need to establish civic morality. Transparency was also 
identified as an integral part of the fight against corruption. Regarding 
asset recovery especially the problems that arose when states 
attempted to recover funds called for stronger cooperation.  
 
Session 11-12 
At the eleventh session, the Commission continued its efforts regarding 
the UNCAC and drafted a resolution for recommendation by the 
ECOSOC for adoption by the General Assembly titled “High-level 
conference for the purpose of signing the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption” (E/CN.15/2002/14 chapter I, sect. A, draft res. II). 
The resolution presented the offer by the Mexican government to hold 
such a conference to initiate the signing of the UNCAC (ibid. §2-7) and 
also requested the Ad Hoc Committee to attempt to finish its work on 
the Convention by the end of 2003 (ibid. §1). 
Furthermore, the Commission commenced the preparations for the 
Eleventh Congress and suggested in a draft resolution to include 
“Corruption: threats and trends in the twenty-first century” (ibid. draft 
res. IV §3b) into the agenda for the Congress. Additionally, a workshop 
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on “Combating corruption” (ibid. §4h) should be considered. In the 
discussions and draft resolutions concerning international cooperation, 
corruption was frequently listed as an area of importance.  
In addition, the Commission also considered a report by the Secretary-
General on the “Implementation of the United Nations Declaration 
against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions” (E/CN.15/2002/6). In this document, the Secretary-
General concluded that “it is difficult to ascertain whether the 
adoption by the General Assembly of the [Declaration] has had direct 
impact on domestic legislation” (ibid. §68). This report was part of a 
number of reports by the Secretary-General for the Commission to 
review the use of United Nations rules in the fight against corruption.  
 At the end of the twelfth session of the Commission it became even 
more apparent that the members of the Commission had great interest 
in finishing the work on the UNCAC by 2003. Apart from stressing the 
importance of international cooperation in the context of anti-
corruption efforts, and praising the work of the Ad Hoc Committee for 
the negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, speakers also 
requested that the Committee should “further efforts to finalize its work, 
so that the new instrument could be approved by the General 
Assembly […] by the end of 2003” (ibid. §72).  
 
Sessions 13-20 
In 2004 and 2005, the work of the commission regarding corruption 
mainly dealt with the UNCAC once again. Among other things, it urged 
Member States to sign the Convention (E/CN.15/2004/16 & 
E/CN.15/2005/20).   
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Since the 15th session of the Commission in 2006, corruption has neither 
been discussed in the course of a thematic discussion, nor has it been 
an integral part of any resolution drafted by the Commission, except for 
cases when a resolution called for further international cooperation. 
Only in preambular paragraphs the Commission recommends those 
members, who are not yet states parties, to sign and ratify the 
Convention. 
 
5.2.2 The CCPCJ as a regime 
The CCPCJ, like the Crime Congress, is primarily concerned with 
fighting crime on a global scale and thus includes corruption in its 
agenda. Its guiding principle is the work on crime related topics, which 
include anti-corruption measures, and it is a subsidiary body for the 
ECOSOC.  
The resolutions of the CCPCJ are in fact only drafts which then have to 
be adopted by the ECOSOC or the General Assembly – and in general 
all are adopted unanimously due to the Vienna Spirit. However, those 
resolutions still form the basic norms for the CCPCJ. Some of the key 
resolutions drafted by the CCPCJ and later adopted by the ECOSOC 
and/or the General Assembly, which form the set of norms of the 
Commission, were prepared by the Crime Congress, the ECOSOC, or 
the General Assembly.  
Thus, the key norms of the CCPCJ are its resolutions on the topic of 
corruption, which were later adopted by the ECOSOC or the General 
Assembly. The individual provisions of those resolutions can be seen as 
the rules of the CCPCJ.  
The CCPCJ is composed of 40 Member States which are selected by 
the ECOSOC and are distributed among the Regional Groups. 
Although the term of office is only three years, it is renewable; 
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therefore, the five permanent members of the Security Council are 
customarily always represented at the CCPCJ. 
The decision-making process of the CCPCJ is driven by the Vienna Spirit 
and thus decisions are always made unanimously. To reach this 
unanimity, the work of the CCPCJ is divided between the Plenary, 
where the agenda is carried out, and the Committee of the Whole, 
which works on all draft resolutions and is frequently the forum where 
heated discussions to find an agreement take place. The draft 
resolutions which pass the Committee of the Whole are then adopted 
in the Plenary.  
It is rather difficult to define the impact of the CCPCJ itself, as its 
decisions are passed on to the ECOSOC or the General Assembly and 
then adopted there. However, the Commission provides a forum for 
discussion and exchange of experience and information.  
In the future, the topic of corruption could easily be picked up and 
further discussed in the Commission. If one or more member states feel 
the need to introduce a draft resolution on corruption or a related 
topic, or include the issue in a resolution on a different topic, corruption 
as a topic would re-enter the forum of the CCPCJ.  
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5.3 The United Nations Convention against Corruption 
5.3.1 UNCAC Overview 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption was adopted by the 
General Assembly in resolution 58/4 in 2003 (A/RES/58/4). The 
Convention has since then been seen as a milestone in the fight 
against corruption worldwide, as it is by far the largest (and at least 
partially legally binding) legal instrument against corruption with 159 
State Parties.  
Between 2002 and 2003, the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of 
the Convention against Corruption drafted the convention. However, 
the attempts of the United Nations to establish a legal instrument 
against corruption reach further back in time, and were driven in part 
by the Congress and the Commission. 7  There were a number of 
approaches and attempts that were not directly taken by the 
Congress or the Commission, which is why this chapter will address and 
elaborate on anti-corruption efforts of the United Nations, while 
excluding the actions taken by the Congress and the Commission.  
The earliest attempts to tackle corruption in the context of the United 
Nations date back to the 1970s and 1980s. However, in most cases they 
proved to be unfruitful, mostly due to different opinions of developing 
and developed states. For example, a number of nations drafted and 
submitted resolutions on corruption to the General Assembly in 1975, 
but later withdrew those proposals (cf. Posadas 2000: 365). The same 
year the Assembly adopted a resolution titled “Measures against 
corrupt practices of transnational and other corporations, their 
intermediaries and others involved” (A/RES/3514), which “condemns all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 see Chapters 3.1 and 3.2 
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corrupt practices, including bribery by transnational and other 
corporations” and asked states to take measures against corrupt 
practises in accordance with their national laws (ibid. §2). Furthermore, 
the ECOSOC was advised to “direct the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations to include in its programme of work the question of 
corrupt practises” (ibid. §6). Home and host governments were asked 
to cooperate on the issue, but “within their national jurisdictions” (ibid. 
§5). This resolution marks the first international recognition of corruption 
in at least one aspect of trade.  
In 1976, the ECOSOC continued the United Nations efforts regarding 
corruption by establishing the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working 
Group on Corrupt Practises (cf. Posadas 2000: 367). The Working Group 
finished its work in 1978 and submitted a draft for an international 
instrument against illicit payments in international transactions. It is 
interesting to note that the ECOSOC’s first concern was the code of 
conduct and that “the conclusion of an international agreement on 
illicit payments should in no way interfere with or delay that priority” 
(ibid.). Therefore, no further actions in this direction were taken until the 
late 1980s, although it has to be said that it was not for lack of trying. 
For example the United States submitted a resolution regarding illicit 
payments to the ECOSOC in 1977, but withdrew it again after it 
became apparent that at this point in time no agreement would be 
found among states. To summarize, the efforts of the United Nations in 
the 1970s and 1980s were mostly hindered by a conflict between 
developing and developed states. While developed states longed for 
an international agreement on illicit payments, the developing states 
regarded a code of conduct on transnational cooperation as a 
prerequisite (cf. ibid. 368). 
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At the end of the 1980s, the world order began to change, which was 
in part due to the changes in the Soviet Union and its subsequent 
collapse. Thus, the issue returned to the agenda of the United Nations in 
the context of organised crime. In the ECOSOC resolution of 1989/70 
(E/RES/1989/70), the Council stated that organised crime had caused 
“the spread of such negative phenomena as […] corruption” (ibid.). In 
the General Assembly resolution 45/107 (A/RES/45/107) nations are 
asked to take measures against corruption, and the Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Branch of the Secretariat was directed to draft a 
manual regarding approaches on combating corruption  (cf. Posadas 
2000: 371). 
In 1992, the deliberations on the Code of Conduct, which the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations had still been working on, 
finally failed and gave way for a new approach to corruption in 
international commercial transactions (cf. ibid. 372). 
In 1996, the “U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in 
International commercial transactions” (A/RES/51/191) was adopted by 
the General Assembly. This resolution, which was not legally binding, 
was essential for defining the way the United Nations viewed issues of 
corruption. Among other things, it distinguished between active and 
passive bribery, requested states to develop standards that could help 
fight corruption and asked for mutual legal assistance (cf. Posadas 
2000: 375). 
The same year, the General Assembly adopted a significant resolution 
which was prepared by the Crime Congress and the CCPCJ, namely 
the “Action against corruption” (A/RES/51/59), which adopted the 
“International Code of Conduct of Conduct for Public Officials.”  
	   56	  
Although both resolutions were not legally binding, they were proof of 
the commitment and the effort the member states had towards 
combating corruption in the 1990s.   
In 1997, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime was established 
as the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for 
International Crime Prevention were merged. The UNODC was 
established by joining the Centre for International Crime Prevention 
and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (cf. 
A/51/950, Action 8). 
A big step towards a convention on corruption was marked by the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC), as it covers corruption in articles 8 and 9. The UNTOC was 
adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 2003. It is supplemented by 
three protocols which were adopted in 2001 and entered into force 
between 2003 and 2005. 
Article 8 of the Convention titled “Criminalization of corruption” 
requested states to define the following as criminal offences:  
• The promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or 
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or 
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or 
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; 
(UNTOC 2000: §1a) 
• The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or 
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or 
herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or 
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. (ibid. 
§1b) 
	   57	  
Paragraph 1 of article 8 therefore not only attempted to criminalise 
active, but also passive bribery. According to the Convention, those 
offences should also be valid for foreign officials and international civil 
servants (cf. ibid. §2).  
Article 9 dealt with “[m]easures against corruption” and requested 
states to “adopt […] measures to promote integrity and to prevent, 
detect and punish the corruption of public officials” (ibid. §1). However, 
calls to establish an independent instrument designed specifically for 
the fight against corruption arose shortly after the UNTOC was adopted 
(cf. A/CONF.187/15). 
In 2001 an informal preparatory meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee for 
the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption took place in 
Buenos Aires. In the General Assembly resolution A/RES/56/186 entitled 
“Preventing and combating corrupt practices and transfer of funds of 
illicit origin and returning such funds to the countries of origin,” the 
Assembly requested the ECOSOC to present Draft Terms of Reference 
for the Negotiation of a Convention Against Corruption (ibid. §5). In 
resolution A/RES/55/61 the Assembly came to the conclusion that an 
independent international legal instrument against corruption was 
necessary and decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee for the 
Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, which was to meet in 
Vienna (ibid. §7). Consequently, the Ad Hoc Committee met in Vienna 
seven times between the beginning of 2002 and the end of 2003 to 
develop a Convention Against Corruption. The Ad Hoc Committee 
approved a draft version at its last session from 29 September to 1 
October 2003, which was then adopted by the General Assembly in its 
resolution A/RES/58/4. 
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5.3.2 The UNCAC as a regime 
At the moment, the UNCAC is the anti-corruption regime of the United 
Nations which is most frequently described in research, mainly because 
it is often the only anti-corruption regime of the UN to be discussed at 
all. To put it in other words, the United Nations’ anti-corruption regime is 
regularly summed up as being the UNCAC. This classification might 
prove useful when comparing a number of anti-corruption regimes of 
an international nature; however, a close analysis shows that another 
classification is possible, namely to see the UNCAC as a regime of its 
own (among other anti-corruption regimes within the UN system.  
The central principles of the UNCAC regime are outlined in the 
preamble to the Convention, where it is stated in preambular 
paragraph 1 that corruption poses a threat to “the stability and security 
of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, 
ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development 
and the rule of law” (UNCAC 2003). Corruption is therefore seen as a 
crime that affects almost all aspects of a state, and needs to be 
addressed on a global level. 
The central norm is, of course, the Convention itself, but it is 
supplemented by the resolutions of the Conference of the States 
Parties, and here especially the Resolution 3/1 (cf. CAC/COSP/2009a) 
has to be emphasised, as it establishes the Review Mechanism for the 
Convention.  
The rules of the UNCAC regime are the binding as well as the non-
binding provisions of the four chapters of the Convention, and the 
provisions of the resolutions of the Conference of the States Parties   
The decision-making processes for the UNCAC are centred on the 
Conference of the States Parties (CoSP), which is anchored in article 63 
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of the Convention. Its objectives should be to “achieve the objectives 
set forth in this Convention and to promote and review its 
implementation” (UNCAC 2003, chapter VII, art. 63 §1).  
According to article 63 §4, the CoSP should facilitate 
• activities by States Parties under articles 60 and 62 and chapters II 
to V of this Convention, including by encouraging the 
mobilization of voluntary contributions; 8 (ibid. §4a) 
• the exchange of information among States Parties on patterns 
and trends in corruption and on successful practices for 
preventing and combating it and for the return of proceeds of 
crime, through, inter alia, the publication of relevant information 
as mentioned in this article, (ibid. §4b) 
as well as work together with governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, use work previously done by other anti-corruption 
mechanisms, review the implementation process periodically, try to 
improve the Convention and its implementation, and help with issues of 
technical assistance requirements (ibid. 4§c-g). 
At the first CoSP it was decided to establish an Expert Working Group to 
recommend the mechanism for reviewing the implementation of the 
Convention at the second CoSP (cf. CAC/COSP/2006a). In its resolution 
3/1, the CoSP adopted the mechanism for the Review of the 
Implementation of the Convention and established the Implementation 
Review Group (cf. CAC/COSP/2009a). The Group functions as an 
open-ended intergovernmental group and meets on an annual basis 
to oversee the review process.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 art 60 and 62 cover the topics “training and technical assistance” and 
„implementation of the Convention through economic development and technical 
assistance“ 
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In the “Terms of Reference of the Mechanism for the Review of 
Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption” 
it was decided that the Working Group should 
have an overview of the review process in order to identify 
challenges and good practices and to consider technical 
assistance requirements in order to ensure effective 
implementation of the Convention. The thematic implementation 
report shall serve as the basis for the analytical work of the 
Implementation Review Group. On the basis of its deliberations, 
the Implementation Review Group shall submit 
recommendations and conclusions to the Conference for its 
consideration and approval. (UNODC 2011 chapter IV, sect. C 
§44) 
Furthermore, the decision-making aspect of the UNCAC regime is 
comprised of two more Working Groups, namely the Open-ended 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Asset Recovery, established at 
the first CoSP session in 2006, and the Open-ended Intergovernmental 
Working Group on Prevention, established at the third CoSP session in 
2009.  
According to Resolution 1/4 of the first CoSP session 
(CAC/COSP/2006b), the Working Group on Asset Recovery had the 
responsibility to assist the CoSP  
• in developing cumulative knowledge in the area of asset 
recovery, especially on the implementation of articles 52-58. 
(ibid. §2a) 
• in encouraging cooperation among relevant existing bilateral 
and multilateral initiatives and to contribute to the 
implementation of the related provisions. (ibid. §2b)  
• in identifying the capacity-building needs. (ibid. §2f) 
In addition, the Working Group was asked to  
• Facilitat[e the] exchange of information among States (ibid. §2c) 
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• [Build] confidence and encourage[e] cooperation between 
requesting and requested States by bringing together relevant 
competent authorities and anti-corruption bodies and 
practitioners involved in asset recovery (ibid. §2d) 
• Facilitat[e] the exchange of ideas among States on the 
expeditious return of assets (ibid. §2e). 
The Resolution 3/2 of the third session of the CoSP (CAC/COSP/2009b) 
not only established the Working Group on Prevention, but also defined 
its functions as being responsible to assist the CoSP  
• in developing  and a cumulating knowledge in the area of 
prevention of corruption. (ibid. §3a) 
• in encouraging cooperation among all stakeholders and sectors 
of society in order to prevent corruption. (ibid. §3d) 
and facilitate  
• the exchange of information and experience among States on 
preventive measures and practices. (ibid. §3b) 
• the collection, dissemination and promotion of best practices in 
corruption prevention. (ibid. §3c). 
Furthermore, it was decided that in the case the Implementation 
Review Group established thematic sub-groups, the Working Group on 
Prevention should be subsumed under those (ibid. §4). 
At the moment, the UNCAC has 158 States Parties, thus covering 
approximately 82% of all United Nations Member States. The most 
prominent States not to have ratified the Convention yet are Germany, 
the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. 
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5.4 StAR Initiative  
5.4.1 The World Bank 
As the StAR Initiative is a joint initiative of the World Bank and the 
UNODC, it is imperative to describe the structure of the World Bank and 
its efforts in the fight against corruption.  
To begin with, it is important to distinguish between the World Bank and 
the World Bank Group. The former consists of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA), while the World Bank Group, in 
addition to the IBRD and the IDA, also includes the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).   
The World Bank was established at the Bretton Woods Conference 
together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1944. 
Traditionally, the President of the World Bank is a US-American national, 
while the IMF’s Managing Director is a European. The bank was created 
“as an institution for funnelling capital to the war-torn global periphery 
in the face of liquidity constrained capital markets” (Gilbert, Powell, 
and Vines 2000: 42). However, this very narrow view of the World Bank’s 
responsibilities is not no longer valid, researchers nowadays argue that 
the World Bank “is an institution whose objective is the promotion, 
world-wide, of sustainable economic development and poverty 
reduction” (Gilbert and Vines: 2000: 10). 
In comparison with other international organisations, the World Bank’s 
first anti-corruption efforts came fairly late. The main reason for this is 
that, according to its statutes, the World Bank has to remain non-
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political, and not get involved with a political agenda in any way (cf. 
Marquette 2004: 414). This was the excuse for not participating in the 
global fight against corruption the World Bank used for a very long 
time. 
For years, former World Bank director, and later founder of the NGO 
Transparency International, Peter Eigen, unsuccessfully attempted to 
“convince the Bank to pursue an overt anti-corruption approach” 
(Jakobi 2010: 91). Only in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the 
World Bank started to engage in the international discourse on 
corruption. In 1990, Ibrahim Shihata, a former General Counsel, 
circulated a memorandum in which he clarified which features of 
governance the Bank could not get involved in due to its mandate:  
• the Bank cannot be influenced by the political character of a 
member; 
• it cannot interfere in the domestic of foreign partisan politics 
of a member;  
• it cannot act on behalf of donor countries to influence a 
recipient member’s political orientation or behaviour;  
• it cannot allow political factors to influence its decision unless 
there is also an “obvious” economic effect and 
• its staff must not build their assessment on the possible 
reactions of a particular Bank member of members 
(Marquette 2001: 398) 
However, Shihata did not rule out a possible World Bank involvement in 
governance. On the contrary, he left the possibility to engage in anti-
corruption measures open for the Bank, as long as they did not 
contradict the governance features mentioned above.  
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In 1996, the president at that time James David Wolfensohn affirmed 
the World Bank’s goal to “fight the cancer of corruption” (World Bank 
2000: 1). 
The World Bank’s efforts can be described on four different levels. Firstly, 
it aims to prevent corrupt acts within Bank-financed projects. The 
second is to assist nations who request support in the fight against 
corruption. The third level is to consider the issue of corruption more 
carefully, both in the planning of projects, but also in forms of national 
assistance. Lastly, the World Bank aims at supporting international 
efforts to combat corruption (cf. Leeuw, Van Gils, and Kreft 1999: 194-
195).   
The work on the first level not only focuses on external partners but also 
on internal practices (Jakobi 2010: 91). A key figure in this area is the 
manager for Business, Ethics, and Integrity, whose tasks mainly consist of 
ensuring that the Code of Professional Ethics and other Bank standards 
are known to the staff, improving the possibility for whistleblowers to 
report misconduct, and encouraging staff members to make such 
reports (cf. World Bank 2000: 19). Furthermore, in 1997 the Bank  
“implemented monitoring systems used in other lending institutes and 
surveyed smaller procurement contracts by external auditors” (Jakobi 
2010: 91, and in 2001 it started to publish data on firms and individuals 
who were proven to be involved in corruption (ibid). The Department 
for Integrity was launched in 2001, and it was aimed at “discovering 
corruption and monitoring internal and external activities in the search 
for fraud and corrupt practises” (ibid. 92). However, its establishment 
was not without obstacles, as there was no broad consensus on the 
matter within the Bank, which also led to a less effective Department 
and tensions with borrowing countries (ibid.).  
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The Bank’s strategy of helping countries requesting assistance is driven 
by the belief that corruption is caused by dysfunctional public sector 
institutions. The strategy in this case is split up into five different aspects, 
namely, economic policy reform, administrative and civil service 
reform, legal-judicial reform, financial controls, and public oversight. 
Firstly, it aims at an economic policy reform, such as simplifying rules, 
fighting monopoly powers and strengthening transparency and 
accountability of public institutions. Secondly, an administrative and 
civil service reform is deemed necessary in some cases, especially 
decentralisation and the ensuring of government accountability. The 
promotion of a more efficient legal and judicial system is seen as 
essential, as it helps to ensure the rule of law. Crucial for a well-
functioning government are also aspects such as transparent revenue 
raising and expenditure managements, and thus, fiscal controls are 
indispensable. Lastly, public oversight, including parliamentary 
oversight, the existence of a civil society and independent agencies as 
well as NGOs, are mechanisms to improve accountability and 
performance, which is why the World Bank seeks to strengthens those 
aspects (cf. World Bank 2000: 21-22). In addition to those five aspects, 
the Bank also has a governance and public sector strategy which, 
among other things, tries to develop innovative approaches to lending 
in order to reform the public sector (cf. World Bank 2000: 29-31).  
The Bank’s aim to mainstream corruption considerations into the Bank’s 
operational work is essential for two reasons. The first is that resources of 
the Bank should be focused on the areas where they are most 
effective regarding poverty alleviation, while the second is that the 
Bank is obligated to ensure its funds are used for poverty reduction and 
the assistance of economic development (cf. ibid. 37). The presence of 
corruption within a country was therefore included in project design, 
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management and lending decision as an essential factor, if country 
analyses proved the effects corruption had on the country’s 
development (cf. Jakobi 2010: 92). 
Lastly, the World Bank’s aim to cooperate with other actors in the field 
of anti-corruption included Multilateral Development Banks (MDB), 
international and regional organisations, NGOs, businesses, and the 
IMF. The World Bank’s cooperation with other MDBs covers four different 
aspects of which one is directly concerned with corruption, namely the 
aim to evaluate anti-corruption activities and procedures. Concerning 
international organisations, the World Bank holds an observer status in a 
number of cases, including the quarterly meetings of Interpol, the 
meetings of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International 
Business Transactions, and the Financial Action Task Force meetings, 
which is an initiative to fight money laundering (cf. World Bank 2000: 
48). Most importantly, the World Bank cooperated with the UNODC to 
launch the StAR Initiative.  
The most notable cooperation between the World Bank and an NGO is 
surely its cooperation with Transparency International. However, the 
World Bank also makes an effort to work together with other NGOs, 
such as the Global Coalition for Africa (cf. World Bank 2000: 48). 
In March 2007, the World Bank and the World Bank Group adopted 
their Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) Strategy, and later that 
year also an Implementation Plan.  
The GAC Strategy has three levels of activity. The first is concerned with 
country engagements, the second level with corruption in Bank Group 
operations, and the third with Global Partnerships on Governance and 
Anticorruption (cf. Jakobi 2010: 93). The Strategy is based on seven 
principles.  
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• The WBGs focus on GAC is based on its mandate to reduce 
poverty […]. 
• The WBG’s GAC work must be country driven. 
• Implementation is adapted to individual country circumstances.  
• The WBG will remain engaged even in poorly governed countries 
[…].  
• The WBG aims to engage in its GAC work with a broad array of 
stakeholders. 
• The WBG [will] strive to strengthen, not by-pass country systems. 
• The WBG will work with governments, donors and other actors at 
the country and global levels to ensure a harmonized and 
coordinated approach. (World Bank 2007: 1) 
To sum up, since the 1990s the World Bank has attempted to catch up 
with the anti-corruption discourse, it developed internal measures to 
strengthen its institutional integrity, has started to take aspects of 
corruption into account when giving loans, has put a lot of effort into 
corruption research, and has an approach to combat corruption not 
only in individual projects in specific countries, but also to combat 
corruption in a country as a whole. It tried and succeeded to play an 
essential role in the global fight against corruption.  
 
5.4.2 Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative Overview 
The Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative is a tool for aiding 
developing countries in recovering stolen assets. It was launched in 
2007 as a joint action between the World Bank and the UNODC (cf. 
Larson 2011: 15-16). Its aim, as defined in the Partnership Charter 
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(UNODC and World Bank 2008a: 1), is to “help ensure that there are no 
havens for the proceeds of corruption.”  
The first attempts for asset recovery within the context of the CCPCJ 
can be found in the draft resolution of the tenth session titled 
“Strengthening international cooperation in preventing and combating 
the transfer of funds of illicit origin, derived from acts of corruption 
including the laundering of funds, and in returning such funds” 
(E/CN.15/2001/13/Rev.1).9 
StAR does not use the World Bank’s definition of corruption, but does 
follow lead of the UNCAC by not defining corruption explicitly, but 
indirectly as  
corrupt conduct [defined] in Articles 15 to 22 of the Convention: 
bribery of national public officials; bribery of foreign public 
officials and officials of public international organizations; 
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by 
a public official; trading in influence; abuse of functions; illicit 
enrichment; and bribery in the public sector. In addition, UNCAC 
Articles 23 through 25 identify the following ancillary crimes: 
laundering the proceeds of crime; concealment (of property 
which is the product of a crime); and obstruction of justice (StAR 
2011). 
Asset recovery plays an important role in the UNCAC, as an entire 
chapter (chapter V) is dedicated to this aspect of corruption. 
Furthermore, it is one of the global goals of the World Bank’s 
Governance and Anticorruption efforts, as it aims at “[h]elping 
enhance a country’s ability to track, freeze, and confiscate the 
proceeds of corrupt behavior, including through technical assistance 
for asset recovery and monitoring of use of recovered assets” (World 
Bank 2007: ix). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 see Chapter 5.2.1 CCPCJ Overview 
	   69	  
Since its establishment in 2007, the priorities of StAR have shifted. 
Originally, its two priorities were to lower the barriers for asset recovery 
in major financial centres, and to build technical capacity and 
facilitate asset recovery (cf. UNODC and World Bank 2008b: §1). 
However, within the first year of its establishment, the conclusion was 
reached that StAR had to be more proactive and that it would take 
some time before the Initiative could assist in a large number asset 
recovery cases (cf. ibid. §3). 
Thus it was decided that StAR had better chances of success, if the 
focus was shift towards its first priority – i.e. the lowering of barriers for 
the recovery of stolen assets – and more effort was put into this aspect 
(ibid.). Furthermore, StAR should focus on providing practical tools for 
practitioners (cf. ibid. §11) and actively advocate the issue at 
international conferences (cf. ibid. §16).  
In cooperation with the World Bank’s legal department, StAR has 
developed rules of engagement for country engagements (cf. ibid. 
§25) and is working on establishing a “consultative process to help 
identify opportunities for collaboration with civil society organizations” 
(cf. ibid. §33). 
 
5.4.3 The StAR Initiative as a regime 
As the StAR Initiative is a joint effort of the World Bank and the UNODC, 
its guiding principle can also be seen as their agreed upon approach 
towards asset recovery, which is that “theft of public assets from 
developing countries is a huge and serious problem” (UNODC and 
World Bank 2007: 1). 
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The key norms are the chapter V of the UNCAC – Asset Recovery, 
which also constitutes the legal foundation for the Initiative, and the 
Governance and Anticorruption Strategy paper “Strengthening World 
Bank Group Engagement on governance and anticorruption”. (World 
Bank Group 2007) 
Its rules are thus the asset recovery related provisions of those two 
documents.  
The governance structure is comprised of the Management 
Committee, the StAR Secretariat, the Donor Consultative Group and 
FStAR (Friends of StAR). The Management Committee consists of two 
permanent members from the Bank and the UNODC each, and is 
additionally chaired by the Bank’s Vice President for Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Management (cf. UNODC and World Bank 2008a: §10). 
Additionally, members of the Bank and the UNDOC can be asked to 
be present if this is deemed necessary by the Chair. The meetings are 
held annually, however, according to the Charter, it is possible to meet 
more often. The decisions made have to be reached without 
objections by any permanent member and by consensus (cf. ibid. §11-
12). 
According to §3 of the Charter, the Management Committee is in 
charge of   
• (i) Setting overall policies and priorities for StAR. 
• (ii) Overseeing StAR activities. 
• (iii) Approving the annual StAR work plan and its amendments. 
• (iv) Allocating the StAR Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) between 
components and indicative allocations to individual activities. 
• (v) Designating activities financed by the Trust Fund as either 
Bank-managed activities or UNODC-managed activities. 
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• (vi) Approving specific activity proposals and the allocation of 
StAR MDTF funds to the activity, consistent with the StAR work 
plan, as reflected in the Concept Note submitted by the 
Secretariat. 
• (vii) Approving StAR strategies for country engagement and the 
allocation of StAR MDTF funds to the country strategy, assessing 
risks of proposed and ongoing StAR activities and ensuring that 
adequate risk mitigation measures are put in place. 
• (viii) Approving the StAR annual report. 
• (ix) Appointing the members of FStAR and selecting its Chair, as 
well as determining the Terms of Reference for FStAR. 
• (x) Approving appropriate evaluation benchmarks and 
methodologies to assess the impact of StAR activities and 
commissioning any independent evaluations. 
• (xi) Adopting this Charter and approving any amendments” (ibid. 
§13).  
However, the day-to-day work of the Initiative is covered by the 
Secretariat. The Secretariat also supports the StAR mandate and is 
bound by “the Bank’s standard operational and administrative policies 
and practices” (ibid. §14). It is also important to note that the 
Secretariat is operated under Bank rules and is also conducted this way 
(cf. ibid §15).  
Some of the functions of the Secretariat include:  
• (i) Preparing the annual StAR work plan and budget and any 
amendments; 
• (ii) Preparing specific activity proposals, consistent with the StAR 
work plan, including specific budgets for each StAR activity, for 
Management Committee approval. 
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• (iii) Coordinating implementation of the work plan across the 
Bank and UNODC, with clear deliverables and accountability for 
results. 
• (vii) Helping ensure that the Bank’s and UNODC’s country 
representatives are informed of requests for StAR assistance, 
consulted regarding the scope and nature of StAR assistance, 
and informed of progress in StAR activities and substantive 
discussions with national authorities. 
• (viii) Acting as the central point of contact in the Bank and 
UNODC for countries seeking or receiving support under StAR 
and to Donors. 
•  (ix) Reviewing proposed StAR activities for consistency with this 
Charter, including the Principles and Objectives. 
• (xi) Designing appropriate methodologies to assess the 
development impact of StAR activities. 
• (xvi) Preparing the agenda, minutes and background 
documentation and providing logistical support for the 
Management Committee, Donor Group and FStAR meetings. (cf. 
ibid §18) 
Member States who contribute to the Trust Fund are organised in the 
Donor Consultative group. They are responsible for reviewing the Trust 
Fund implementation, they have a “consultative role regarding future 
plans and past activities”, and can make recommendations to the 
Management Committee concerning the strategic direction of StAR 
(ibid. §19).  
Lastly, FStAR is an advisory group consisting of experts from a number of 
different fields and different regions from all over the world. Their 
function is to provide “strategic guidance and set overall policies and 
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priorities for StAR” (ibid. §21). All members of FStAR are appointed by 
the Management Committee.  
Those four entities constitute the decision-making process of StAR; 
however, it is important to note that the Donor Consultative Group and 
FStAR only have an advisory role. 
While it is rather obvious why the Crime Congress, the CCPCJ and the 
UNCAC are analysed as regimes, it is not immediately apparent with 
the Initiative. Can the StAR Initiative actually be seen as a regime? It 
appears to be more of a practical application of provisions rather than 
a norm setting entity itself. As can be seen in this chapter, it does have 
all four distinguishing criteria for a regime. However, apart from those 
four concepts, Krasner’s regime theory also calls for “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relation” (Krasner 1982: 186). We have established that there are sets of 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes, but what about 
the actors and the area of international relation?  
I would argue that asset recovery indeed is an, albeit very narrow, area 
of international relation, but that the significant difference between the 
StAR Initiative and the other bodies lies in the fact that the “actors” are 
not states, but two international organisations, namely the World Bank 
and the UNODC. 
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6 Differences and Similarities  
6.1 The Chart 
  
fig. 1  Comparison Chart 
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6.2 The Comparison 
From the data gathered, we can conclude that the presumption that 
four regimes are part of the United Nations’ anti-corruption efforts is not 
accurate, but that the case is rather that the CCPCJ and the Crime 
Congress together form an anti-crime regime, which includes the fight 
against corruption. The Crime Congress and the CCPCJ can thus be 
seen as two decision-making mechanisms for the same regime. I would 
suggest labelling this regime the “General United Nations Regime.” It 
can also be said that this particular regime has been immensely 
weakened by the establishment of the UNCAC mechanism, which took 
over most of the work in this area. However, compared to the UNCAC, 
the General United Nations Regime still has a bigger sphere of 
influence. Its major weakness is the missing possibility to review the 
implementation of all its rules by its members.   
The UNCAC forms, as already elaborated upon in other literature, an 
anti-corruption regime of its own, with distinct norms, rules and 
decisions-making processes. It is by far the most comprehensive and 
strongest regime among the three described here. Although it is based 
on the General United Nations Regime, the UNCAC differs greatly from 
it regarding its norms and principles. Additionally, the definition of a 
regime requires “actors’ expectations [to] converge in a given area of 
international relation” (Krasner 1982: 186). However, the actors involved 
in the General United Nations Regime and the UNCAC regime are not 
identical, as not all members of the UN are States Parties to the UNCAC.   
For the StAR Initiative, which only deals with one aspect of corruption, I 
would argue that it is an anti-corruption regime which covers one 
aspect of corruption (similar to the OECD anti-corruption regime which 
only covers bribery). It is a regime in its own right, and its principles differ 
	   76	  
greatly from the principles of the other two regimes, especially due to 
the influence of the World Bank. Furthermore, it differs in a key aspect, 
as its actors are not nations, but rather two international organisations.   
To take a look into the future, it can be presumed that the StAR 
Initiative will take a leading role regarding its area of expertise, namely 
asset recovery, and become an even greater driving force in this field, 
provided that it also manages to establish itself as a mechanism to 
facilitate asset recovery procedures.  
The Commission and the Crime Congress together form a working 
forum in which the world community can exchange views and set 
goals in the area of the fight against corruption. As corruption is a topic 
which reaches into all fields of major crime, it has to be taken into 
consideration when any other area of crime is tackled. Therefore, a 
further development of the anti-corruption agenda, especially in the 
case of the CCPCJ, possibly also with new rules, is conceivable in the 
future. This view is supported by Mrs Dorothee Gottwald, who stated 
that “the strength of the CCPCJ is that they have a broader field to 
cover, […] it depends a lot on from which country a specific initiative 
comes, whether it can fly in the CCPCJ” (Appendix 2, question 4). 
The UNCAC and its Conference of the States Parties is the strongest 
anti-corruption regime in place, and it is also the only one that deals 
exclusively with corruption and does not focus on one single issue. Its 
strength is derived from the Review Mechanism in place, which 20 
years after its first cycle will provide a comprehensive review of the 
implementation of the entire instrument. This is not at all given at the 
General United Nations Regime. Furthermore, possible developments 
within the frame of the issues currently dealt with in the Convention 
could be covered by amending the Convention.  
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7 Conclusion 
The discussions surrounding the topic of corruption within the context of 
the United Nations began in the 1970s, and were either subsumed 
under economic crime or organised crime for a long time. Only in the 
1990s it became an issue of its own standing, which was necessary to 
face the broad range of issues related with corruption.  
The original hypothesis of this thesis was that the United Nations’ anti-
corruption efforts can be seen not just one single regime, but as up to 
four, namely the Crime Congress, the CCPCJ, the UNCAC, and the 
StAR Initiative. This has been tendentiously partially verified. As has been 
elaborated upon in chapter 6, we can categorize the UN efforts in 
combating corruption into three regimes. Although the anti-corruption 
efforts of the United Nations can be seen as spreading across three 
different regimes, the UNCAC is the only regime in place that deals 
exclusively, yet comprehensively, with anti-corruption efforts. The 
general United Nations’ anti-corruption regime does approach 
corruption from a collective anti-crime point of view, and also 
emphasises the way corruption is linked to other crime-related issues. Its 
potential, especially regarding the fight against corruption in relation to 
other forms of crime, lies very much in standard setting, and providing a 
global forum, which includes, even if not to its full potential, NGOs and 
the private sector.  
The future will show how effective the review mechanism of the UNCAC 
is and which results it will provide. The first results were the executive 
summaries of the findings of the first Review Cycle of Finland, Mongolia, 
Spain, and Uganda, and have been presented at the Resumed 
Second Session of the Implementation Review Group in September 
2011 in Vienna.  
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The StAR Initiative can be seen as a regime of the broader UN family, as 
it is a collaboration between the World Bank and the UNODC. 
Furthermore, it focuses on one specialised aspect of corruption, namely 
asset recovery, which is a novelty. The StAR Initiative has filled an 
important void in the global fight against corruption. Apart from this, it is 
an excellent example for the possibilities which exist when two 
international organisations as important as the World Bank and the 
United Nations commit to a project together, and it could thus become 
a role model for future cooperation in other areas.  
To conclude, it can be said that the United Nations, as the only global 
organisation, plays a key role in the international fight against 
corruption. As we can see, there are three different regimes of the 
United Nations to fight corruption. Still, the efforts should be continued 
and expanded. Corruption is the fuel for a great number of forms of 
crime, such as cybercrime and drug trafficking, and I believe that the 
role corruption plays in those forms of crime have to be tackled 
specifically as well. The future will eventually bring new challenges in 
the field of the fight against corruption, and the United Nations will 
have to decide how and with which methods at their hand they are 
going to take them on.  
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Appendix 1 
 
Meeting with CEB (Demostenes Chryssikos) 21.5.11 
1. How did the CEB develop, and how did it come into existence? 
Exists since 2003. The UNODC used to have a small crime conventions 
section in ‘03, then came the decision to separate. The Corruption 
Branch became a branch. The result of the Doha conference was an 
increase in mandates. 
 
2. How does the financial situation of the CEB look like and does it 
have an advantage over other branches, because the UNCAC 
Review mechanism is not subject to voluntary contributions? 
There is a multiplicity of mandates. It is always an expanding area of 
work. The special thing about the review cycle is that it is long term [1st 
cycle: 5 years, 2 Chapters findings in 6 years, whole convention 20 
years]. 
 
3. The term “corruption” is not defined in the UNCAC, does the lack 
of definition have any impact on the work of the CEB? 
It is not a problem: there are arguments in favour of not including it. The 
concept of corruption is fluid and evolving, a definition would be 
counterproductive. After some years, new issues could arise which 
might not be covered by a definition. The alternative of a definition is to 
deal with concrete issues and include a broad range of offences. 
[Note: another example for terminological difficulties] Art 33: an issue 
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was that “Whistleblower” is not a term in all legal jurisdictions therefore 
“reporting person” is used, furthermore, in some countries whistleblower 
has a negative connotation. Reporting persons is neutral. 
 
4. Is there cooperation between CEB and TPB or/and OCB and how 
does this cooperation look like?  
Before the political mandate everything was done by the crime 
commission. Ad Hoc Committees were established. CCPCJ was mainly 
a policy body. CCPCJ renews mandates on an annual basis all 
mandates for corruption until the next IRG. Since corruption is seen 
related to other fields, the scope has expanded: corruption and 
organised crime internally coordinate in order to produce reports. There 
is also cooperation with the OCB on training issues. There is less 
cooperation with the TPB, but we are all under the DTA umbrella. 
 
5. How does the CEB deal with the various bodies which provide 
guidance? (UNCAC COSP, Working Groups, CCPCJ, Crime 
Congress)  
Governmental bodies [CND, CCPCJ, Crime Congress + other 
governmental bodies like IRG (COSP TOC; COSP CAC plus IRG, WG, 
etc.)] can all give mandates. 
 
6. How does the involvement of CEB and CEB personnel in the 
CCPCJ look like? 
We help organize the agenda for next year. The reports by the UNODC 
are done by our personnel. The report is substantive documentation. 
Report may entail results on corruption: see mandates. Duty to collect 
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information (Note Verbale) and include information in report. During 
Sessions: Serving CCPCJ on agenda item notes, reflect views of 
member states, we are also present at informal consultations. 
AD Resolutions: The commission adapts draft resolutions for ECOSOC in 
July (and GA at the end of year), then it is a mandate. Sometimes only 
ECOSOC adapts a resolution, depends on the content. 
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9.2 Appendix 2 
 
Meeting with Dorothee Gottwald – 16.12.2011  
1. How is the CEB structured? And who has what responsibilities? 
The CEB is structured in two sections: the Conference Support Section 
and the Implementation Support Section. I think we are still in process 
to exactly structure the responsibilities. In theory it’s easy. In theory, the 
Conference Support Section services the conference, and it takes the 
lead in servicing the Asset Recovery Working Group, the 
Implementation Review Group, the Secretariat for the Review 
Mechanism and the StAR Initiative. The Implementation Support Section 
takes the lead in servicing the Prevention Working Group, that’s all the 
work on prevention, and also the work with the private sector, the civil 
society, and it follows up on specific technical assistance projects. The 
Technical Assistance as such is a cross-cutting issue, the CSS will take 
the lead more on the technical assistance that comes out of the 
Review Mechanism, and ISS takes the lead more in specific projects. In 
practice, however, since the beginning of the separation two sections, 
a year more or less, we have seen that staff members of both sections 
support staff members in the other sections. Why? I think, first out of 
pragmatism, because people have specific skills, people have specific 
knowledge and expertise on specific fields that should not be lost to 
the other sections, and people also have language skills that can be 
very helpful in different settings. But then also out of deep conviction 
that the things are very closely linked. Especially if you see the Review 
Mechanism and Technical Assistance, there is absolutely no way that 
we can separate them, and that is also one of the main guiding 
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principles of the Review Mechanism as such – that it is a constructive 
mechanism that can lead to technical assistance.  
 
2. How does the cooperation within the UNODC, so with other 
branches, but also with regional offices work, when you are 
dealing with corruption issues. How does that work?  
That’s a very good question. Maybe I’ll start with the regional offices. 
Are you referring to field offices in general? – Or specifically the 
regional hubs? Because we have different categories. We have 
regional offices, we have country offices and we have project offices. 
The correct denomination is the Field Office Network. Also, let’s 
differentiate between the work that they are doing for the Conference 
of the States Parties and the Review Mechanism, and the Technical 
Assistance Projects. They kind of interact but they are very different. 
And maybe I should add a third category, which is the work which we 
contribute to the regional and country programmes. So let’s start with 
the Conference of the States Parties and the Review Mechanism. Once 
a year we do the drawing of lots of the countries in the Review 
Mechanism, and of course all of these countries that come out of the 
boxes fall under the responsibility of one of the field offices – be it a 
country office or a regional office. Then, after the session where we 
have the drawing of lots, we send a note to the field representative to 
inform them that this or that country under their responsibility is 
undergoing review or is reviewing another country. In many cases this 
comes with a request for help to follow up with counterparts for the 
nomination of experts or focal points, or sometimes also supporting the 
progress in the completion of the self-assessment checklist. In the first 
contact, normally, is the nomination of experts, that’s a very concrete 
request. Then, further on there may be different kinds of assistance a 
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country needs. One is the already mentioned help in the progress of 
the self-assessment checklist, that is of course a more complex thing 
that comes with more time which is needed, and sometimes also 
resources, if a consultant is needed. Sometimes it’s also more a 
punctual request like the translation of documents. Maybe a general 
remark on the translation of the review mechanism, the translation is 
fully organised through our field office network, because translation 
here in Vienna is quite costly and quite time-consuming, and we are 
very grateful for the help of our Field Office Network through which we 
can efficiently organise our translation. Next point, in the Review 
Mechanism, when we have country visits to specific countries, it is when 
the Field Offices come in more than before and take a very active role. 
In general I would say if we talk about communication, the Review 
Mechanism is a bit of a specific situation in our work, because here we 
have very strong working relationships directly with the counterparts in 
the countries, because this is an intergovernmental progress. It is not 
some Technical Assistance Project which we are implementing through 
our Field Office Network, where we are more in a backstopping role, 
but this is completely an intergovernmental and headquarter 
organised activity. However, we copy the field representatives to all the 
important communications and many times we happily rely on their 
expertise and their contacts in the country to make the whole thing 
work.  
The second block that I mentioned before is the Technical Assistance. 
Here it depends very much on a specific case whether the bulk of the 
work is done in Headquarters or in the field. We have anti-corruption 
projects that are completely field driven and we are copied in and 
sometimes comment on documents, for example, how it fits in with the 
Convention and what we are doing, but we also have projects that are 
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implemented with a great part of expertise from Headquarters and the 
Field Offices are more in a supporting role, so here it depends very 
much on the specific case. Same thing with the regional and country 
programs, this should also, ideally, be a field driven exercise, but of 
course each part of the house gives their input. It’s something that a 
country or regional program is developed in cooperation between the 
Integrated Programme and Oversight Branch here in Headquarters 
and the Field Offices, but not so much with the substantive offices like 
corruption or Organised Crime, but of course when they have a draft 
they send it to us and we give our input. So here we are more in a 
supporting role and we give our input based on our knowledge of the 
Convention and of the implementation of the Convention in specific 
countries.  
With other parts of the house we first have a cooperation in the 
preparation of these country programs, because everybody is pulled 
together. Then we have specific reporting obligations together with 
other parts of the house, for example the reports to the CCPCJ that’s 
together between Corruption and Organised Crime on international 
cooperation and in the fight against Organised Crime. And of course 
we have specific activities that we implement together with other parts 
of the house, for example the Global Program for Money Laundering 
and we have some activities with the Justice Section, for example 
Judicial Integrity. I would say there is no one answer for all activities, but 
it depends a lot on the area we are working on. 
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3. In your opinion, do the CCPCJ, the UNCAC and the Crime 
Congress have different approaches to tackling corruption? Do 
they complement each other? Or isn’t there much of a 
difference? 
I would say it depends a bit on time. Right now they have very different 
functions. The CCPCJ is the governing body of the UNODC in crime 
matters, and they have a standing item on their agenda on corruption. 
Technically many of the mandates that we receive come from the 
CCPCJ, and the COSP has a different function, it’s not so much giving 
mandate to UNODC but to the Secretariat of the COSP whose function 
is realised by UNODC. It is UNDOC in a different function. If you look at 
the resolutions of the CCPCJ and the COSP, they read completely 
different. The CCPCJ resolutions or the reports on corruption are very 
generic and they touch on some specific issue but they don’t have the 
level of detail that the COSP has. The CoSP is the forum where all the 
State Parties of the Convention come together, which is also a different 
set of States than the States represented at the CCPCJ. So the 
mandate for the Secretariat really comes from the COSP – that’s our 
day-to-day work. The mandate of UNDOC as an organisation comes 
from the CCPCJ. For now, I would take the Congress a bit out of that 
because in the last congress there was not so much discussion about 
corruption at all, I think especially now that we have the Convention 
and we have the COSP. It must have been different before my time, at 
the 8th congress where actually the first impulse to create the 
convention came. So that’s really a different issue. Of course at the last 
congress in Brazil, there was discussion on related issues, especially on 
international cooperation on criminal matters and I will also put in there 
the issue of cybercrime but this is related issues, it’s not corruption.   
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4. In your opinion, which institution – CCPCJ, Crime Congress or the 
Secretariat to the Convention, is more likely to adapt to future 
challenges of corruption? Maybe in five, ten or twenty years’ 
time. 
A: That’s a difficult question – I don’t really see that we can foresee 
that, because they have different functions. I think the strength of the 
CCPCJ is that they have a broader field to cover, and that they also, 
as we’ve touched before, have a different mandate, a different 
membership, and so on, so it depends a lot on from which country a 
specific initiative comes, whether it can fly in the CCPCJ. The strength 
of the Conference of the States Parties is that it already has a binding 
text and now, five years after entering into force, the text can also be 
amended. So if it is something that could be solved by amending the 
existing convention, I think the Conference of the States Parties would 
be the body, but we’ve never really had the case yet. But then in such 
a case the Conference of the States Parties would probably be the 
body that’s more likely to move, if it’s a new challenge that comes up 
in a more general discussion about crime prevention and criminal 
justice, then it would probably be the Commission. But honestly, there 
are so many factors, and also political factors – in terms of which 
country it comes from and which coalition of countries can support a 
certain movement, and so on – that I think it’s a bit too difficult to say it 
now.  
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Abstracts 
 
Korruption ist in den letzten Jahren immer stärker in den Blickpunkt der 
Öffentlichkeit gerückt. Maßnahmen der Korruptionsbekämpfung 
werden immer weiter entwickelt, sowohl auf regionaler, nationaler, 
aber vor allem auch internationaler Ebene. Die Vereinten Nationen 
haben seit den 70er Jahren Ansätze zur Korruptionsbekämpfung 
entwickelt, zunächst über den Crime Congress, dann auch in der 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, und wohl am 
prominentesten im Rahmen der Konvention gegen Korruption der 
Vereinten Nationen (UNCAC). Ein Neuling auf dem Gebiet ist die StAR 
Initiative, die eine Kooperation der UNODC und der Weltbank in einem 
Spezialgebiet der Korruptionsbekämpfung darstellt, nämlich der 
Rückführung von Vermögenswerten, welche mithilfe korrupter Praktiken 
erworben wurden. Diese Arbeit untersucht diese Bestrebungen der 
Vereinten Nationen um zu bestimmen wie sich diese in verschiedene 
Regime einteilen lassen. Dazu wurde eine Inhaltsanalyse relevanter 
Dokumente durchgeführt, und diese Erkenntnisse durch 
Experteninterviews erweitert. Die Ergebnisse wurden in einer Tabelle 
vergleichend dargestellt.  
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In recent years, corruption has become a more and more prominent 
topic in the public eye. Actions against corruption are taken on 
regional, national, and especially international levels and are also 
being further developed. In the 1970s, the United Nations took its first 
approaches towards the fight against corruption, first in the context of 
the Crime Congress, later in the Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice and, most noteworthy, in the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). The newcomer in this area is 
the StAR Initiative, which deals with a specialised field of anti-corruption 
efforts, namely the recovery of assets that have been obtained by 
corrupt practices. It is a joint initiative of the UNODC and the World 
Bank. This thesis explores the United Nations’ anti-corruption efforts with 
the goal to determine how they can be divided into individual regimes. 
To this end a content analysis of relevant documents was carried out. 
The insights were supplemented with expert interviews and the results 
were presented in a chart for comparison.  
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